Intrusion Detection and Prevention: Immunologically Inspired Approaches by Pipa, Devid
  
Intrusion Detection and Prevention: 
Immunologically Inspired Approaches 
 
Devid Pipa 
 
 
 
 
 
Technical Report 
RHUL-MA-2008-01 
15 January 2008 
 
 
 
Royal Holloway
University of London
 
 
 
 
Department of Mathematics 
Roal Holloway, University of London 
Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, England 
http://www.rhul.ac.uk/mathematics/techreports
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
2
 
 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention: 
Immunologically Inspired Approaches 
 
 
Devid Pipa 
Supervisor: Alexander W. Dent 
 
 
 
 
Submitted as part of the requirements for the award of the MSc in Information Security at 
Royal Holloway, University of London. 
 
 
 
 
 
I declare that this assignment is all my own work and that I have acknowledged all 
quotations from the published or unpublished works of other people. I declare that I have 
also read the statements on plagiarism in Section 1 of the Regulations Governing 
Examination and Assessment Offences and in accordance with it I submit this project 
report as my own work. 
 
 
 
Signature: 
 
Date: 05 – October -2007 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dedication 
 
To my beloved parents who helped me get this far and were always there for me. They 
believed in me even when I did not believe in myself and never let me down in any way 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
4
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
The author gracefully acknowledges the help of Professor Genc Sylcebe of the Universit of 
Tirana and the Mother Teresa Hospital, for the very helpful and patient explanations and 
insights into immunology. 
 
A special thanks also goes to Dr. Alex Dent for his very kind help, endless patience and 
understanding. 
 
Also a special thanks to Professor Peter Wild and Dr. Zbigniew “Chez” Ciechanowicz for 
their very good will and helpfulness. 
 
A special thanks goes to fellow student Igor Yuklyanyuk for some of his good insights. 
 
Royal Holloway University of London 
Information Security Group 
 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
5
 
 
 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention: 
Immunologically Inspired Approaches 
 
 
By 
 
Devid Pipa 
 
 
 
 
 
September 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
6
 
Table of Contents
Introduction.......................................................................................................................................... 7 
Motivation from Immunology......................................................................................................... 9 
Aims & Expected Outcomes ........................................................................................................... 9 
A general overview........................................................................................................................ 10 
Chapter 1 ........................................................................................................................................... 12 
Human Immunology .......................................................................................................................... 12 
1.1  An Overview .......................................................................................................................... 14 
1.2  The Layers.............................................................................................................................. 15 
1.3  Innate and Adaptive Immunity............................................................................................... 16 
1.3.1  The Innate Immune System............................................................................................ 17 
1.3.2  The Adaptive Immune System ....................................................................................... 18 
1.4  Adaptive Immunity in Detail.................................................................................................. 21 
1.4.1  Pathogenic Substances.................................................................................................... 21 
1.4.2  Lymphocytes................................................................................................................... 22 
1.4.3  The Recognition Process ................................................................................................ 22 
1.4.4 Specificity of Lymphocytes ............................................................................................. 24 
1.4.5  Self/Non-Self Discrimination & Negative Selection...................................................... 24 
1.5  Adaptation and Learning ........................................................................................................ 25 
1.5.1  B Lymphocytes .............................................................................................................. 26 
1.5.2  Autoimmune Responses ................................................................................................. 28 
1.5.3  T Lymphocytes ............................................................................................................... 28 
1.6  A Summary............................................................................................................................. 29 
Chapter 2 ............................................................................................................................................ 31 
Issues, Principles & Guidelines ......................................................................................................... 31 
2.1  Information Security Issues.................................................................................................... 33 
2.2  Design Principles of Computer Security ............................................................................... 34 
2.3  Principles for Computer Immune Systems............................................................................. 35 
2.4  Detection & Prevention.......................................................................................................... 38 
2.5  The Security Policy of the Immune System........................................................................... 39 
2.6  Self & Non-Self In a Computer.............................................................................................. 40 
2.7  Misuse or Anomaly Detection................................................................................................ 41 
2.8  Issues to be Addressed............................................................................................................ 42 
Chapter 3 ............................................................................................................................................ 44 
Current Research & Literature........................................................................................................... 44 
3.1  Architecture Proposals............................................................................................................ 46 
3.1.2  Limitations...................................................................................................................... 49 
3.2  The Methods and Algorithms ................................................................................................. 51 
3.2.1  Defining Self................................................................................................................... 53 
3.2.1.2  Analyzing with Respect to Knowledge of Self ....................................................... 55 
3.2.1.3  Loss of Information ................................................................................................ 56 
3.3  Anomaly Detection Method .................................................................................................. 57 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
7
3.3.1  Some Analytical Points................................................................................................... 62 
3.3.1.1  Splitting the Data Stream........................................................................................ 62 
3.3.1.2  A Summery of the Splitting Process ....................................................................... 68 
3.3.1.3  Detector Set Size..................................................................................................... 69 
3.3.1.4  Detector Set Size – A quick summarization............................................................ 73 
3.3.1.5  The Existence of Holes ........................................................................................... 74 
3.3.1.6  The Existence of Holes – A Summary .................................................................... 77 
3.4  Negative Selection Methods................................................................................................... 79 
3.4.3  Linear Time Algorithm ................................................................................................... 81 
3.4.4  Greedy Algorithm........................................................................................................... 82 
3.4.5  Counting the Holes Method............................................................................................ 83 
3.5  A General Summary ............................................................................................................... 84 
Chapter 4 ............................................................................................................................................ 85 
Evaluation, Analysis & Ideas ............................................................................................................. 85 
4.1  System Calls for a Sense of Self ............................................................................................ 87 
4.2  The Architectures ................................................................................................................... 88 
4.2.1 The Architectures – Some conclusions............................................................................ 89 
4.3.1 Splitting the Data ............................................................................................................. 90 
4.3.2 Detector Set Size & Holes ............................................................................................... 91 
4.3.3 Hypermutation................................................................................................................. 91 
4.4  Dual Authentication................................................................................................................ 92 
4.5  General Conclusions and Opinions ........................................................................................ 93 
Bibliography....................................................................................................................................... 95
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
In the area of information security, one of the main issues to be dealt with, is intrusion detection. As a term, 
this refers to the process of the detection of an anomaly that would cause undesired or unwanted effects. 
These anomalies are generated by malicious users, through the use of malicious software, such as viruses, 
worms, etc, or through the direct exploitation of holes in the system. Holes, are a result of design and 
implementation oversights in software. These holes are then exploited by malicious users. Intrusion detection 
systems have the purpose of covering such holes with the appropriate protection. A large selection of 
intrusion detection software is available nowadays, including firewalls, intrusion prevention systems (IPS), 
virus scanning software etc. The systems have sets of functions that provide some level of security that is 
missing in the software they are protecting. These pieces of protective software are placed as an extra layer 
on top of the base software, such as the operating system, to provide an extra layer of security. 
 
The functions performed by these types of software include the following are to ensure that the three issues 
of information security, namely confidentiality, integrity, availability, are addressed, and the appropriate 
protection level is placed in order to meet the requirements in terms of the three above issues. Also the two 
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not so popular issues of accountability and correctness need to be addressed. 
Some of the functions performed by these systems are: 
 
? Examine and monitor system and user activity 
? Examine configuration files 
? Monitor overall integrity of the system 
? Track security policy violations 
 
The main concern of these systems is the enforcement of the security policy, however as stated in the [18] 
and [16], the security policy is often incomplete due to oversights caused by the complexity of nowadays 
systems. It is not possible to consider all eventualities. The problem with these traditional methods is that 
they are based on a static set of rules and can only offer the protection that is stated in each specific rule. 
These rules are, each, highly specific to one kind of attack. If an attack is performed in a novel way for which 
a rule does not exist, the system will not be able to offer the right protection. Due to this, a more dynamic 
method for the protection of the systems we rely so much on is needed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
10
 
Motivation from Immunology 
 
According to [13], computer security can be viewed as a process of discrimination between authorized 
actions, legitimate users, etc, and intrusions such as viruses, trojans, etc. The immune system of the human 
body has been performing such an action for a much longer time and it is very likely that it has developed a 
set of techniques and mechanisms that are, in comparison, a great deal better than the ones used in the current 
computer security systems. And it certainly has, as in the opposite case, the human race would be 
extinguished by now. 
The immune system of the human body is a collection of mechanisms and techniques that offer an overall 
defense for the organism in a both distributed and localized manner. These are specific and non specific 
mechanisms. The specific ones, offer a level of defense against one single type of threat, whereas the non 
specific ones have a more wide range. This is much like the defense mechanism in the information security 
world such as specific ones, through virus signatures and non specific ones such as firewalls and encryption 
mechanisms. The specific ones, are a good way of defense towards known and previously encountered 
attacks, for which a signature as been developed. These however have a difficulty in keeping up with the 
dynamically changing attacks. The non specific ones, do offer a good level of general efense, however they 
are static. They form a preventive barrier in the prospect of intrusion and are not able to detect a currently 
ongoing intrusion. 
The immune system offers levels of defense for the organism that are very dynamic. They prevent known 
intrusions and are also able to dynamically adapt themselves in order to detect ongoing ones. This latter 
concept is the one of interest to this study. 
The idea of applying immunological principles to the systems of computer security was introduced in 1994 
by Jeffrey Kephart in the design for an immune system for computers and networks [15]. 
 
 
 
Aims & Expected Outcomes 
 
The aim of this study is to primarily gain a good knowledge of the human immune system and the techniques 
it uses for the detection and prevention of intrusions in the organism. The next step is to make a research into 
the current advancements of technology towards the embedding of these techniques in the systems of 
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intrusion detection for computers. Also a number of concepts, acting as guidelines, for the design of such 
systems will be looked into. 
This study is an attempt towards the individuation of the progress of research towards the goal of embedding 
human immune system principles in the are of intrusion detection. The intent is to gain a good knowledge of 
both areas and derive a set of conclusions ad evaluations for this. 
 
Once the appropriate research has been conducted, the study will present an evaluation for the number of 
concepts that have been embedded form the immune system into the intrusion detection methods and 
techniques designed. 
The study will also present a set of conclusions in an evaluative manner for the problems that might be 
encountered by these systems in the prospect of intrusion detection. In this, an attempt will be made to 
present a number of personal ideas. 
 
 
 
A general overview 
 
I would like to present a general overview of the contents of this study so that the reader can gain an idea of 
what there is to follow in the next chapters. 
The initial step, as previously mentioned, will be to take a deep look into the human immune system. A set of 
different concepts will be introduced here in the context of how the immune system of the human body 
provides the defense mechanisms at cellular level. The concepts of innate and adaptive immunity will be 
looked into. The latter of the two is the one of interest to the field, therefore details will be provided for the 
explanation of its techniques and methods. Here the reader will be introduced to the concepts of self/non-self 
discrimination and negative selection. These are the concepts that are of importance to the current research. 
 
Further in the study, we will deal with gaining a knowledge of the issues of information security and what 
these mean. Also, the reader will be presented with a collection of guidelines to be kept in mind in the design 
of these systems. The next step will be to individuate the concepts and issues that need not be looked into 
through the literature research. 
 
The next chapter will deal with presenting a series of methods and techniques that have been designed by 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
12
researchers in order to analogize these concepts on self/non-self discrimination and negative selection and 
adapt them towards addressing the issues of information security. In some cases, a detailed description will 
be given for these methods, however the details of these methods do not have a major bearing on this study 
as we are only trying to evaluate the general idea. The details will be extracted from a selection of sources 
and presented more for an illustrative purpose. 
 
The final chapter will deal with providing a set of conclusions derived form the research conducted in the 
previous part of the study analyzing the extent to which the concepts have been embedded from human 
immunity to computer security. 
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Chapter 1  
Human Immunology 
 
 
 
 
The study cellular and molecular immunology is one the the newest topics of the biological and medical 
fields. This science deals with the study of the immune system of the human species. The following chapter 
will deal with getting a good overview and understanding of the immunological system of our organisms. 
 
With the discovery of the different roles of molecules, cells and organs in the years 1955 to 1960, 
immunology went from being simply a phenomenological science to forming a major medical discipline of 
its own [1]. 
 
The obvious question at this point would be; Why should the world of information security concern itself 
with immunology? The answer to that is quite simple and straight forward. Our computer systems are 
reaching complexity of magnificent proportions. Programs are constantly increasing in size and operational 
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complexity. This has led to higher unpredictability in their day to day tasks and also unreliability in the 
context of their security. Although we are led to believe that almost all software undergoes very thorough 
testing phases in the search for bugs in the code and vulnerabilities, experience has taught us this is often not 
enough. 
 
Because of all of the above considered factors we need defense mechanisms to ensure the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of all these systems and the data contained in them. 
 
There are many different solutions to enforce such security. We all know about firewalls and intrusion 
detection and/or prevention systems, anti virus software etc. However, as much as they are capable of 
detecting old or better, known attacks they are very vulnerable to new or better, novel attacks. These systems 
rely on the knowledge of known signatures for the detection and prevention of intrusions. This makes them 
vulnerable to attacks for which a specific signature does not exist. 
 
At this stage it becomes quite obvious to try and learn from someone or something that has been fighting 
intrusions for much longer than we have. The natural immune system is a complex system that has been 
detecting and fighting intrusions in order to protect our bodies since the start of mankind. This system is very 
good at fighting known intrusions and it also has the capability of adapting itself to detect and neutralize new 
ones. Clearly a system with so much experience could teach us a thing or two about detecting and combating 
intrusions. 
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1.1  An Overview 
 
 
In medicine. and all related areas, the term immunity refers to protection from disease or infection. The term 
immune system refers to that set of molecules, cells and organs which perform the needed functions to 
produce such immunity. The collective and coordinated response of this system upon the detection of a threat 
is called an immune response. 
 
Our organism is under constant threat from harmful substances and foreign agents. In the medical world these 
are called  pathogenic substances (also known simply as pathogens). Pathogens are infectious agents that 
cause a deterioration of the state of well being of their host. The duty of the immune system is to recognize 
these pathogenic substances and neutralize them while trying to cause the least damage to the body [1][2]. 
 
At this stage it is important to put some emphasis on the above point. Neutralization of the pathogenic 
substance while causing the least damage. The immune system performs a very indispensable set of tasks 
in order to keep the organism it belongs to, healthy. However, it has to be noted that there is a very fine line 
drawn here. The immune system has the potential to fully destroy such organism. This can occur in two 
different ways. Upon the introduction of a pathogen in the system, an under reaction by part of the immune 
system will allow the pathogen to overpower the organism that it penetrates. This will lead to the 
deterioration of this organism and eventually to its death [1][2].  
 
There is also the concept of overreaction. This is the case when the immune system reaction towards an 
intrusion is of much larger magnitude then actually needed. This eventuality would also lead to deterioration 
of the individual's health and if continued in time could also lead to total neutralization of the organism itself. 
In one simple word, death [1][2]. 
 
The immune system is a highly complex defense mechanism. It is a self maintaining and self monitoring set 
of organs which is able to respond to any challenge. It is also self regulating in order for its response to a 
challenge not to be harmful to the organism's health [3].  
 
This system involves a set of organs and cells which work in very sophisticated ways to create the best 
possible response towards the detection and elimination of a threat. There is a number of concepts and ideas 
to be deduced from the workings of such system that can be very beneficial to the world of information 
security. 
 
The architecture of this system is a multi-layered one. There are multiple defense mechanism working at 
different levels in the body, each providing indispensable defense. The aim of this complex set of defense 
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mechanisms is to maintain homeostasis. This word is derived form ancient Greek and is formed of the 
following two words: 
 
Homoios – same, resemblant, alike 
Stasis – to stand, a posture, a state 
 
In immunology, this term, refers to the organism's property to maintain a coherent state of tranquility and 
stability. This state is very relative and is very variable even when the organism is considered to be in a 
healthy state. The reason for this is the constant threat that any body is under. This threat being a large 
amount of pathogenic substances which attack our system at any given time. However the immune system 
tries to maintain this state, to the best of it's possibilities, within certain boundaries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2  The Layers 
 
As mentioned above, there are a number of mechanism that form the immune system. Each of these perform 
a set of tasks in order for the detection and neutralization of pathogenic substances. These mechanism 
perform these task at different levels within the body. Some of them act as an actual physical barrier. Other 
mechanisms perform functions to create a physiological barrier for pathogenic substances. These are factors 
such as acidity or high body temperature, which create an inhospitable environment for pathogenic 
substances. Under these living conditions, such substances face a much higher level of difficulty towards 
their evolution. However, if these substances menage to perpetrate these types of defenses, cellular 
immunology comes into play. These are the defenses that form the innate and adaptive immune system. This 
type of defense is the one that we are most interested in, and for the purpose of this study, in particular, the 
adaptive immunity. 
 
Breaking down the levels of immunity present in this system, we would have the following [1]: 
 
? Physical – E.g. Skin. This organ plays a very important role. It acts as shield towards any 
pathogenic substances trying to intrude into our system. 
 
? Physiological – E.g. Temperature, Sweat Glands. These create inhospitable living conditions by 
lowering the pH level and creating a higher acidity on the surface. These conditions are very 
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unfavorable towards the evolution of any pathogenic substances. 
 
? Cellular – If one or more pathogenic substances perpetrate the previous two levels of defense, 
cellular immunological mechanism come into play. These act at the very cellular level through a 
process known as intra-cellular killing. The immune system has a large number and variety of cells 
to its disposal to serve this purpose. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3  Innate and Adaptive Immunity 
 
Immunologists like to differ between two kinds of immunity. Innate and Acquired immunity. There is a big 
difference between the two, in context of the different types of defense they offer against pathogenic 
substances [2] [3]. 
 
 a) Innate Immunity – This is simply the immunity that we are born with. It is not conditioned by a 
 previous contact with a pathogenic substance. It is composed of a complexity of factors which create 
 the first barrier from a foreign intrusion. In the evolution of a species this is the first immunity to be 
 created. In humans this immunity is created in the fetus during pregnancy. This includes the  anatomic 
physical barrier that we know as  the skin. 
 
 b) Adaptive Immunity – This is the immunity that is created by the organism itself through contact 
 with a  pathogenic substance. It is also known as Acquired or Gained Immunity. The agents of 
 this type of immunity are high specific. This means that a set of agents is only built to respond to a 
 certain type of pathogenic substance. 
 
Innate immunity can be considered as a traditional intrusion detection method. It is light-weight and has a 
broad spectrum, however there is no capability there for the detection of novel attacks. Therefore, this study 
will base itself around the principles behind the adaptive immune system. 
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1.3.1  The Innate Immune System 
 
This part of the chapter will only provide a short description of the innate immune system. The redear is 
asked to refer to [1] [2] [3] for more detail. 
 
As stated above the innate immune system is the set of immunological knowledge that our body is born with. 
In this is included all the immunological resistance formed through the evolution of the species and passed on 
generation after generation to the present date. This type of immunity is ready and functional from the 
moment that we are born. It s not in any way conditioned by a prior contact with a pathogenic substance. The 
limitation of this system is that it is non specific to any pathogenic substance, therefore it has a relatively 
narrow gamma of action towards the different types of intrusions. This is only effective against already 
known pathogens. 
 
Immunology includes in this system the physical and physiological barriers mentioned in the previous 
section. However, once a pathogenic substance menages to perpetrate these barriers, cellular mechanism 
come into action. Here is where the process of intra-cellular killing comes into action [1]. 
 
This type of immunity is very similar between individuals given that all the information contained is purely 
passed on from individual to individual through generations. It can only defend against pathogenic 
substances previously encountered by the individual's predecessors. 
 
Also, this type of immunity is constant throughout the lifetime of an individual. It has no ability to adapt 
towards combating novel pathogens. 
  
Given the low specificity of innate immunity and it's stated inability to individualize novel pathogenic 
substances, it is not feasible to continue investigation towards it. We are interested in the individuation of 
novel attacks. Protection from previously known attacks is easily implementable in nowadays intrusions 
detection and prevention systems. For the purpose of recognition and defense from novel attacks, we need to 
look at the procedures and mechanism of the Adaptive Immunity present within our bodies. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3.2  The Adaptive Immune System 
 
This part of the research is extracted from [12] [1] [2] [3], and to some extent, the initial chapters of [10] and 
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[11] have been consulted. 
As stated above, this type of immunity, is the one that is able to detect and protect the organism from novel 
attacks. As opposed the the innate immunity, adaptive immunity has highly specific responses. There are two 
main properties that make the difference between this type of immunity and the innate one [1]: 
 
? Gained immunity is high specific towards one type of pathogenic substance as opposed to the innate 
immunity which does not have such property. 
 
? The evolution of gained immunity towards a specific type of pathogenic substance requires a prior 
contact with the pathogenic substance. 
 
Upon the event of a pathogenic substance entering the organism there are a number of steps taken towards 
the recognition and neutralization of the pathogenic substance and the evolution of the immunity towards that 
type of substance. 
 
The first step is the recognition of the existence of a threat. So, once a novel pathogenic substance has 
perpetrated into the organism, there is a procedure called recognition process. 
 
Once the recognition process is conducted successfully, and a threat from an unknown pathogenic substance 
is individuated, the immune system takes action towards fighting this threat. 
The first encounter with an unknown type of pathogen is known as the primary immune response. This 
response takes action and eliminates the threat. 
The next step taken by the immunological system is a learning process that is performed after the pathogenic 
substance has been cleared. In this process the immune system will memorize a fraction of the cell that 
successfully recognized the pathogenic substance. This is called the evolution of immunity. Through this 
process, the immune system trains itself towards the recognition of novel pathogens, so in future re 
occurrences of a threat by the same or a similar type of pathogenic substance, the response will be much 
faster and effective. 
There is also something known as a secondary immune response. This is the response made by the 
immunological memory of the system towards a pathogenic substance. This response is much more efficient, 
as the immune system already has the necessary information about how to fight this substance and the 
duration in time from the moment of the intrusion till its full elimination is much shorter and homeostasis is 
maintained much more optimally than in the case of the primary immune response. 
 
So, a conceptual summarization of these procedures would be; Upon the detection of a malicious intrusion in 
the body the system reacts with an immune response. There are two types of immune responses [10] [11]: 
 
? Primary immune response – The body deploys a series of agents to combat the intruder. This leads 
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to the neutralization of the threat. During this phase, the deployed agents must adapt in a certain way 
to meet some requirements in order to succeed in the neutralization of the threat. Once the 
pathogenic substance posing such threat is eliminated, a fraction of the recognizing agent is saves in 
the immunological memory for use in case of future occurrences. 
 
? Secondary immune response – This is the response created by the immune system in the 
eventuality of a threat by a pathogenic substance that was previously combated or a similar one. 
Less time and energy has to be spent in the recognition and adaptation towards meeting the 
requirements for fighting this substance, therefore the response if quicker and the immune system 
requires less time to deploy more, already adapted agents, for the purpose of the neutralization of 
this intrusion. 
 
The following graph, Figure 1.1, shows a graphical representation of the primary and secondary immune 
responses, visualizing the difference in lymphocyte number and time. The antibody level represents the 
number of lymphocytes allocated towards combating the intrusion. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Graphical representation of the primary and secondary immune 
responses in the human immune system. Extracted from [10]. 
 
Even the adaptive immune system however is not absolute. By no means can it be called perfect. But, 
relatively to other types of defense mechanism, it is the best defense mechanism that we know. It does not 
provide an absolute defense against harmful substances. There are many pathogens which this system fails to 
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combat successfully. However, the main property of this system that is of most interest to this study is its 
ability to detect an intrusion from a previously unknown pathogenic substance. 
 
The adaptive immune system uses a set of cells which act as agents for this system and detect pathogenic 
substances based on recognition of certain protein structures [12]. Once the protein structure is recognized 
these cells bind to the pathogenic agent and eliminate it. 
 
There is a very important notation to be made at this point. All cells in the body have a protein structure. It is 
the duty of the immune system to create some agent cells, called lymphocytes, on the basis that they should 
not bind to protein structures of cells which are part of our organism. This process is better known as 
discrimination between self and non-self. This is a very important concept which has a major role in this 
study and shall be looked at in more detail in the next section [12].  
 
These agent cells, in the world of immunology, are known as lymphocytes. These form part of the white 
blood cells. Being part of the blood stream, is a very important attribute for lymphocytes. This allows them to 
circulate in the body and makes them able to reach any organ or cell in any system of our organism. 
Lymphocytes are very diverse and have a high specificity to pathogenic agents and substances. They act as 
detectors within the body and identify what is classified and non-self. The large number of these detectors 
and also the distributed architecture of this level of the system creates an efficient mechanism for the 
detection and elimination of pathogenic substances or microorganisms. 
 
Lymphocytes also play a role in the neutralization of pathogenic substances with the aid of other 
microorganisms of the body called macrophages. This however is not of interest to this study and will not be 
covered. We will only deal with the detection process. 
 
The next sections of this chapter present a much better and more detailed view of the concepts and 
mechanisms used by the immune system for the successful protection of the organism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.4  Adaptive Immunity in Detail 
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At this point the reader will recall from the previous section the attributes and general processes used by the 
adaptive immune system in the successful detection and elimination of pathogenic substances. At this point I 
would like to go into some more detail about the procedures involved in this detection. I will explain in some 
more detail some of the components that form this immunity and take part in the detection process. Also I 
will pay some attention towards pathogenic substances and what properties of them make them recognizable. 
Furthermore, there will be some investigation into the phenomenon of the self and non-self discrimination. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.4.1  Pathogenic Substances 
 
Extracted form [1] and [12] 
A pathogenic substance is a general term referring to all cellular based microorganisms that if introduced in 
our organism would be considered as harmful, non-self substances. The introduction of such substances into 
our organisms would cause the triggering of an immunological response. Like all cells, the cells of a 
pathogenic substances present certain protein structures. In the case of pathogenic substances these are called 
antigenic protein structures, or simply, for convenience antigens or epitopes. These protein structures are 
found on the surface of the pathogenic cell. 
The cells of the adaptive immune system are built in such a way to be able to recognize a pathogenic 
substance form any other type of substance through the patterns in these antigenic protein structures.  
 
The reason for the name “antigenic protein structure” is the fact that these structures go against the genetic 
code, and are not similar to the protein structure of self cells of the system. 
 
These pathogenic substances are detected by a set of cells that form part of the white blood cells and act as 
agents for the immune system. These cells are called lymphocytes. Let us take a look at these in the next 
section. 
 
 
 
 
1.4.2  Lymphocytes 
 
Extracted from [12]. 
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As mentioned before lymphocytes are cells that act as agents of the immune system. These cells form part of 
the white blood cells and circulate through the blood system. Immunologists argue that this is a very strategic 
position for these agents as, by circulating in the organism's blood vessels, they are able to reach any organ, 
extremity or position with the organism that they belong to. The next step is to look at how these agents are 
able to bind themselves to the antigens mentioned in the previous section. 
 
Lymphocytes are a unicellular microorganism. On the surface of these cells, a series of receptors are found. 
These receptors are the component that take part in the the recognition process towards a pathogenic 
substance. They perform such action by binding with complementary antigenic protein structures on the 
surface of the pathogenic substance. There are different types of lymphocytes present within the blood stream 
and we will look at these in more detail later. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.4.3  The Recognition Process 
 
Extracted from [12][10]. 
A recognition process occurs when a pathogenic substance is individuated within the organism by the 
lymphocyte cells of the immune system. Now, the question to be asked at this point is obviously; How is it 
possible for these cells to recognize something that they have not seen before and still be able to detect it as 
foreign and threatening? 
 
I would ask the reader at his point to recall the concepts of antigenic protein structures found on the surface 
of pathogenic substances and the receptors found on the surface of lymphocyte cells. 
 
A recognition, or for the purpose of this study let us call this detection, event occurs when chemical bonds 
are established between these receptors and the antigens. For a chemical bond to be possible between these 
two components, they need to be complementary in structure to each other. This bonding procedure can be 
seen as a matching through pattern recognition. 
 
The bond that is established between the antigen and the receptor of the lymphocyte is almost never perfect, 
especially in the case of introduction on novel pathogenic substances. The extent to which this bond between 
the complementary structures is created, the strength of it if you like, is called affinity. The affinity 
establishes a threshold level for the binding process. This means that it establishes how strong, or to what 
level, these structures must be complementary to each other in order for the event to be classified as a 
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detection of a pathogenic substance. 
 
The next figure, Figure 1.2, displays a visual representation of a lymphocyte and an number of pathogenic 
substances showing the different affinity levels and bonding process. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2  A visual representation of a lymphocyte and it's affinity to a set of 
pathogenic substances. Receptors on the lymphocyte are identical and they are high 
specific to certain types of pathogenic substances. This is the affinity level. 
Extracted from [10]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.4.4 Specificity of Lymphocytes 
 
Extracted from [10][11][12]. 
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The reader will know by now, that lymphocytes are part of the adaptive immune system. This system, as 
stated previously, has the property of high specificity towards pathogenic substances. Meaning that its agent 
cells, the lymphocytes, are each specific to a certain type of pathogenic substance. This phenomenon 
constitutes what immunologists call high specificity of the adaptive immune system. One lymphocyte can 
only bind to a set of antigenic structures. It is not possible for a lymphocyte to bind itself or better, recognize, 
a pathogenic substance that presents antigenic structures outside of the ones that this lymphocyte is trained to 
recognize. Let us shed some more light into why this is and how it is accomplished by the immune system. 
 
As mentioned in previous sections lymphocytes bond to the antigenic structures of pathogenic substances 
through the receptors situated on the surface of such lymphocytes. 
 
The receptor structures on one given lymphocyte are identical to each other. However they differ between 
different lymphocytes. This is what makes a lymphocyte specific to a given type of antigenic structure. 
 
This property of lymphocytes is very often referred to in immunology as monospecificity of lymphocytes. 
 
The next issue to be dealt with at this point is the ability of lymphocytes to recognize pathogenic substances, 
and how this is accomplished when the actual structure is unknown. Let us take a closer look at this in the 
next section. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.4.5  Self/Non-Self Discrimination & Negative Selection 
 
Extracted from [10][11][12]. 
In cell mediated immunity, the cell is the base structure. Pathogenic substances are made up of cells, 
however, so are all the other parts in the body. As the reader will be able to recall, lymphocytes, recognize 
foreign cells through the antigenic structures presented by them. The issue that the immune systems deals 
with at this stage is that, all cells, including the ones belonging to human body, present protein structures on 
their surface. The question to be asked at this point is: How is it possible for lymphocytes not to bond to 
protein structures presented by cells that belong to our organisms? 
 
The solution to the above problem is accomplished by the process known as discrimination of self and non-
self. Let me shed some more light into this very important concept. To make the reader gain a quick 
understanding of this concept, I would like to present a quick explanation of it: 
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The patterns of these protein structures are the base of the recognition process. Self protein structures are 
structures presented by the cells that do belong to the organism and should be there. 
Non-self are structures presented by the cells that do not belong to the organism and should not be present. 
Now, the immune system is aware of what self structures are and only looks for non-self. When a non-self 
protein structure is found, that is classified as a pathogenic substance presenting an antigenic protein structure 
and is eliminated. This process is called negative selection. 
 
Negative selection is a very important concept. This is simply the base concept of the entire working of the 
immune system through which the whole defense from foreign pathogenic substances is realized. There is 
one, very simple concept behind its workings. This is: 
 
The system is aware of what should be there and only fights against those patterns that it does not 
recognize. 
 
Let us present a quick overview of the negative selection process. The immune system is well aware of the 
the self protein structures. When lymphocytes are created, their receptors are created through a randomization 
process, if you will. They are created in such a way so they can be complementary to most protein structures, 
may they be self or non-self. After the creation of these cell, they are negatively selected in such a way that 
those with receptors that are complementary to self protein structures are killed. This is the negative 
selection. After this, only lymphocytes that do not bind to self structures are released into the bloodstream. 
Let us, at this point go onto the next section of this chapter to look at the intricate workings of the cells of the 
immune system and how they realize the phenomenons of negative selection and self/non-self discrimination 
and how all of this makes the adaptation and learning process of the immune system possible. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.5  Adaptation and Learning 
 
The next step into this research is to look at the whole precess by which the agent cells of the immune system 
learn to recognize the non-self or antigenic protein structures and how they do not bond to the self protein 
structures. As mentioned earlier, the lymphocytes are part of the white blood cells and they have receptors on 
their surface which bind to the antigenic protein structures of cells of pathogenic substances. There are two 
main kinds of lymphocytes present within the bloodstream. The B lymphocytes and the T lymphocytes. 
They are also known as B-cells and T-cells.  
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1.5.1  B Lymphocytes  
 
Extracted from [10][11][12]. 
B lymphocytes or B-cells are those agents of the immune system which make the detection process possible. 
These cells are able to adapt to a specific type of antigenic structure and enable the efficient detection of the 
pathogenic cells that present such antigenic structures.  
 
As all lymphocytes, B-cell, present receptors on their surfaces too. When these receptors bind to a protein 
structure, the structure is classified as antigenic and the event is defined as a match event. This match leads to 
the activation. Once a B-cell is activated there is a series of events that take place. This series of events 
develop the adaptive immune response that was mentioned earlier in the chapter. Let us take a look at these 
events in more detail. 
 
Upon activation of a B-cell, a cell division process is started. This is the procedure by which cells in the 
human body multiply. This can be seen very well as a cloning process. 
During the cloning of any B-cell, the receptors of the clones undergo a process that is known as 
hypermutation. This process makes the receptors of the cloned cells mutate at an unusually high rate. The 
reason for this is to ensure that the clones have much higher level of affinity with the antigenic structures 
encountered.  
 
Now, during the cloning process, the affinity of the clones to the presented antigenic structure might decrease 
or increase. This is where the process of negative selection comes into play. The clones with higher affinity 
are the ones that survive this selection process. The ones with lower affinity are eliminated through a 
programmed death. This is called apoptosis. This death happens after a very short time and the reason for 
this is that a lower affinity towards a non-self structure might mean a higher affinity to a self protein 
structure, case in which the immune system would start killing cells that belong to the organism. This 
phenomenon is known as an autoimmune response. In medicine this is classified as a disease, however in 
the modern days it is very very rare [1][12]. 
 
The B-cell clones that survive the process of negative selection are then separated into two different types of 
B-cells themselves. This step is very important towards the adaptation phase of the immune system. The cells 
created in this phase are: 
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? Memory cells – these cells have a long life span and present receptors with much higher affinity 
 
? Plasma cells – these cells have a shorter life span and very few receptors are presented on their 
surface. The purpose of these cells is the production of certain agents known as antibodies. These 
are a type of recognition molecule that is released into the bloodstream by the plasma cells. 
 
The cycle described above is known as the adaptation cycle of the immune system. A simple view of the 
steps of this cycle would be as follows. 
 
1. Activation of B Lymphocyte. 
2. Cloning process and Hypermutation of receptors. 
3. Negative Selection of Cells. 
4. Separation of Memory Cells and Plasma Cells. 
5. Process repeats as a loop until no more bonding is created between lymphocytes and other 
structures. 
 
With each adaptation cycle the B-cells become more and more specific towards a type of pathogenic 
substance. The whole process is repeated over and over until the infection is cleared. This means until all 
cells presenting antigenic protein structures have been cleared. This process constitutes the primary immune 
response. Meaning that it only happens upon introduction of a previously not encountered  pathogenic 
substance. In future occurrences of the same pathogenic structure the immune system will be ready and the 
secondary immune response will lead to a much quicker elimination of the threat. 
 
So, as we can see, a relatively generalized response has evolved into becoming highly specific. As it can be 
seen the inner workings of this system are very dynamic and distributed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.5.2  Autoimmune Responses 
 
Extracted from [1]. 
The reader will recall from previous sections the phenomenon of autoimmune responses. This occurs when 
the receptors of the B-cells start binding to protein structures defined as self. This is what gives the immune 
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system the power to entirely annihilate the organism it belongs to. 
 
It is worth at this point having a closer look at how this phenomenon is avoided by our immune system. 
The process by which the immune system avoids the initiation of auto immune responses is very interesting 
one, and it is a very important process too. 
 
B-cells are created and matured in the bone marrow. This is the location where they undergo a rigorous 
selection process, by which the ones that present receptors that are complementary to self protein structures 
are programmed to die. However this is not sufficient to make these cells entirely tolerant to self protein 
structures. Also, the cloning process which they undergo upon activation starts a hypermutation of their 
receptors, which makes them even less tolerant to the self structures and more prone towards initiating 
autoimmune responses.  
 
This is where another type of cell called the T-cell comes into play. A B-cell, to activate itself, must receive 
two different signals. One is the binding of its receptors to the antigenic protein structure. The other signal 
must come from a set of T-cells called the T Helper cells, also known as TH cells. If the second signal is not 
received the B-cell will die. This process prevents the autoimmune response. Let us take a look at these T-
cells. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.5.3  T Lymphocytes 
 
Extracted from [10][11][12][4]. 
T lymphocytes, or T-cells, are also produced in the bone marrow. Their maturity occurs by migrating to the 
thymus. Here they are made tolerant to almost all self protein structures. The TH-cells ensure tolerance to all 
self protein structures. In the thymus these cells undergo the previously explained negative selection process. 
This process then only allows cells that are tolerant to self protein structures to live. 
The difference between B-cells and T-cells is as follows. T-cells present a unique receptor binding to 
antigenic structures. B-cells instead are antibodies bound to membranes that can only bind to antigenic 
structures on pathogenic substances. T-cells instead, present receptors that recognize antigenic structures in 
combination with a certain set of molecules called Major Histocompatibility Complex, (MHC). 
These molecules can be subdivided into two different types. The first type can be found in cells that present 
antigenic protein structures and shows to the cells of the immune system what they have detected. This type 
of cell I recognized by the TH-cells. The second type of MHC molecule is found in every cell of the body and 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
30
displays the genetic code. This code is what is recognized for the successful performance of the self/non-self 
discrimination. The immune system is aware of what code to expect. If the code is not what is expected, this 
is classified as an infection. 
B-cells use the MHC type on cells that present antigenic structures for the recognition process and then refers 
to the TH-cells to get the secondary approval for this recognition to be interpreted as a detection of a 
pathogenic substance. This approval is known as the costimulatory process. If the approval is given the B-
cell is activated and the adaptation process is started. Otherwise the cell dies through apoptosis. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.6  A Summary 
 
This chapter provided a good description of the immune system and the mechanisms used by it for the 
successful detection and neutralization of a threat. I would like, at this point, to present the reader with a brief 
summary of all that was discussed in the previous sections. 
 
The immune system has a large amount of cells at its disposal. These cells act as agents and perform the tasks 
of detecting and neutralizing pathogenic substances. Each cell is entrusted with a certain task and the 
cooperation of all these cells ensures the correct working of this system. 
 
The chapter has focused its attention towards the adaptive part of the human immune system. This system has 
a very good ability for performing the detection of novel threats. This process is performed through the 
ability of the system towards the discrimination of non-self form self. The system is aware of what belongs in 
the organism and anything that does not meet the previously specified requirements is classified as an 
anomaly and eliminated. 
 
The base cell for the performance of such task is the lymphocyte. Lymphocytes are part of the white blood 
cells. They present a number of receptors on their surface which bond to antigenic protein structures of 
pathogenic substances. The receptors on one pathogen are similar between each other but they differ between 
different lymphocytes. This is what makes the high specificity of them. 
 
The lymphocytes are subdivided into two groups. B-cells and T-cells. These are the cells that form the 
immune response upon introduction of a pathogenic substance. The response is built in such a way to avoid 
autoimmune responses. This fact clearly states the ability of the immune system to discriminate between self 
and non-self. T-cells ensure tolerance to the self elements, whereas the B-cells undergo cloning, 
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hypermutation and negative selection to increase their diversity specificity to pathogenic substances. 
B-cells individuate antigenic structures and T-cells make sure that they are in fact non-self. B-cells can not 
act without approval from T-cells. This dual authentication includes the cloned B-cells. 
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Chapter 2 
Issues, Principles & Guidelines 
 
 
The previous chapter dealt with taking a deep and detailed look into the best intrusion detection and 
prevention system known to science. The human immune system. A number of mechanisms and principles 
were individuated. All these mechanism ensure our well being and protect us from most threats that could, if 
left undetected an not neutralized, annihilate our entire species for that matter. 
 
The following chapter will deal with trying to adapt these concepts into the world of information security. 
Trying to use the mechanisms used by our immune system in an adapted way to ensure the three famous 
goals of information security, Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, is not a trivial task, however, it is one 
very worth looking into. After all most of the mechanisms of the immune system can be viewed as possible 
analogies in the world of information security. Some of them are very good authentication methods, or 
pattern recognition problems, whereas other are problems of distinguishing self form non-self, just the way 
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information security methods attempt the discrimination between legitimate and non legitimate users [13], 
actions or access requests. Both problem which are dealt with to a great extent in computer science as a 
whole and more particularly in information security. 
 
Even though the transition process for these principles is not easy a good analogy between the two can be 
made. Both systems deal with the same problem: Defending their host from threats. The analogy is indeed 
quite simple. The immune system protects the organism from foreign threatening intrusions and a computer 
security system also is there to protect the system from intrusions. 
 
The next sections will deal with looking at the concepts, issues and design principles of both  security 
systems and principles to be used in the design for a computer immune system. 
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2.1  Information Security Issues 
 
 
There are three aspects which are faced by computer security and information security in general for that 
matter. Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability. We are all well aware of these words and are also very 
familiar with them, as they are presented on almost every first chapter of any information security book or 
paper. These are the three main issues that need to be addressed by any security system in the world of 
information security. [18] 
 
? Confidentiality – Access to data should only be granted to authorized users and no one else. Any 
given user should only be able to access the data that he is entitled to and should not be able to get 
access to say another users personal files. 
 
? Integrity – Data needs to be protected from unauthorized change. Any piece of data, weather during 
transit on a network, or simply during the period it is stored and not being used by its legitimate 
users, should not, in any way, be allowed to change. Data should only be altered by legitimate users.. 
 
? Availability – Data and resources should be available upon request by their legitimate users. This 
has to do with the prevention of denial of service attacks.  
 
The above three are the main and most popular issues that information security deals with. However there are 
two other aspects, which sometimes are not mentioned. These are secondary characteristics that are in 
support of the main three described above. 
 
? Accountability – In the eventuality that an intrusion or anomaly in a system has been detected, the 
system should be able to preserve sufficient information in the aid to backtrack to the origin of the 
intruders. 
 
? Correctness – The classification of events should be as correct as possible. False alarms should be 
as minimal as possible. If a legitimate user's actions are too often wrongly classified, this will 
prevent a legitimate user from performing the tasks that he or she is actually entitled to. 
 
The issues stated above play a great role in information security. It can be said that if the mechanisms of a 
security system address all of these issues, then that system is secure. However with the large complexity of 
nowadays systems, there is a great number of number of possibilities of inputs that need to be considered and 
covering all of these issues becomes a very time consuming and difficult task both in the design process and 
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implementation of any security system. 
It is agreed that implementing and maintaining a secure system is difficult and really, there is no practical 
way of ensuring that the required level of security stated by the specification has been met [18]. 
 
Security vulnerabilities result as oversights and holes in the design of software. If these are exploited, the 
result leads to a breach of the security policy. However, there is also the concept of an accepted risk. The 
reader will be introduced to such concept in the following chapter through the acceptance of a failure 
probability. 
 
Considering the size of software that is implemented at present it has become practically impossible to build 
a completely secure piece of software. Therefore it is considered more acceptable to design software and 
accept the possible flaws in it and have a separate system that deals with addressing the flaws in security. The 
task of these systems is to individuate matters such as misuse of the system or anomalous behavior, detect 
and possibly prevent the exploitation of flaws [18].  
 
The next section presents the eight, very important, principles to be kept in mind during the design and 
implementation of a computer security system. 
 
 
 
 
2.2  Design Principles of Computer Security  
 
In an introduction to the protection of information in computer systems written by Saltzer and Shroeder in 
1975 [19], eight design principles for a security system were presented. Even though this dates quite back, 
some, if not all, of them are as relevant today as they were then. These are presented below [19]: 
 
? Economy of mechanisms – Keep the design of a protection mechanism as simple as possible. This 
is a design principle that should be applied in the design and implementation of any piece of 
software, however it it particularly important to the design of security systems. Over complicating  
the design and the implementation of any piece of code might lead to a larger number of 
vulnerabilities that can not be noticed during normal use but are exploitable by attackers.  
 
? Fail-Safe Defaults – Access should be denied unless explicitly authorized. Therefore, in simple 
words, the design should not not be done in such a way to allow allow access to any data or resource 
unless explicitly denied. This is very important in the case of an oversight of an authorization policy 
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for any given object of the system. 
 
? Complete Mediation – Every request for access to protected resources should be processed by the 
protection mechanisms and checked that it does not break the security policy. This is the most 
important principle of design for a security system. 
 
? Open Design – Security by obscurity is bad security. In simple words, the strength of the security 
system should not be any weaker in the case that an intruder knows it's design. The security 
mechanisms should still be able to perform even if their design is well known.  
 
? Least Privilege – Any program should only be given strictly the resources it needs in order to 
perform its functions and tasks. This will make sure that in case of mis performance by any program 
or vulnerability exploitation of any given program will result to as minimal damage as possible. 
 
? Least Common Mechanisms – This principle was suggested earlier by Popek [20]. The idea behind 
it is that the use of shared resources should be minimized. The sharing of resources creates scenarios 
where information is passed between the different resources and this could lead to a compromise of 
security. Adopting this principle in practice however can be hard as suggested by [18]. 
 
? Separation of Privilege – If possible a method of dual authentication should be used for the 
granting of a request. An example would be the case of smart cards, where the user must hold the 
token itself and the PIN code for it. 
 
? Ease of Use – This principle is of vital importance and is concerned with the human element. It is a 
very hard principle to be dealt with in practice as it involves awareness of the user. For example a 
vulnerability that is a breach of this principle is a poor choice of password by the user. And as any 
person who deals with information security will know that a large number of end users will choose 
easily guessable passwords. And not end users only for that matter. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3  Principles for Computer Immune Systems 
 
Computer immune systems is one of the many names by which, the systems designed for the detection if 
intrusions and inspired by the human immune system, are known. This section will deal with the principles 
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deduced from the design of the human immune system. These principles can be very beneficial to computer 
security systems when analogized. As shown in the research done in the previous chapter the human immune 
system has an excellent intrusion detection technique for the individuation of a new, previously not 
encountered threat and a very good ability of improving itself towards the prevention of threats that have 
been encountered in the past. 
 
There are of course some large differences between a human body and a computer. As stated by [17] we 
desire a digital system built out of signals and not cells and molecules. Furthermore, it is important to try 
avoiding the recreation of all the elaborate genetic controls, cell signaling and other aspects of the immune 
systems which are dictate by the physical constraints that such system has evolved under. The last and very 
important issue to be taken into consideration is that the human immune system is a system that has as a main 
objective the survival of its host. A computer security system has as an objective the prevention of any type 
of threat. However the set of principles below should be used as a guideline in the design of a computer 
security system inspired by immunological techniques. 
 
The design principles presented below are as stated by a the paper of Somayaji in 1998. [17] 
 
? Distributadability – The immune system consists of a large number of agents and components that 
are distributed throughout the body. These components interact locally to provide detection and 
protection mechanisms in a distributed manner and there is almost no centralized control or 
coordination. This means that there is no single point of failure in the system. 
 
? Multi-Layered – In the immune system, no single mechanism of defense provides provides 
complete security. Multiple layers of different mechanisms are combined and complement each 
other to provide a high overall security. This is not a new concept in computer security and should 
be emphasized in system design. 
 
? Diversity – One form of diversity can be viewed as the difference in the immune system of different 
individuals of the population. This improves the robustness of the population as a whole. The 
vulnerability of different individuals to the same disease will be at different extents. In an analogy, 
vulnerabilities found in one system would not be present in another. Another level of diversity is the 
difference between components of the immune system within the same individual. This provides 
protection against a large number of threats. 
 
? Disposability – Individual components of the immune system are multitudinous and redundant. In 
simple words the loss of some of the components will have little or no effect in the correct 
functioning of the immune system. The fact that these components are disposable together with the 
lack of centralized control makes the immune system tolerant to failure of some of the components. 
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? Autonomy – The immune system does not require outside management or any type of maintenance. 
It works autonomously and successfully classifies pathogenic substances and repairs itself by 
replacing cells. However it is not yet expected that computer security systems have such a degree of 
independence. However, with the increase in CPU speeds and increase in the complexity of software 
it will be increasingly important for computers to menage security issues automatically. 
 
? Adaptability – The immune system, as stated extensively in the previous chapter, is able to adapt 
towards the faster recognition and elimination of pathogenic substances. This speeds up the primary 
response and makes secondary responses exponentially more efficient. A computer security system 
should also have such properties. Learning to recognize new intrusions and be able to remember 
signatures of old ones. 
 
? No Secure Layer – Any cell in the human body can be attacked by a pathogenic substance. 
Lymphocytes are also cells and they can be attacked too. However these will be attacked by healthy 
lymphocytes. In this concept of mutual protection we can analogize a secure code base. 
 
? Dynamically Changing Coverage – The immune system does and can not maintain a large enough 
set of lymphocytes to cover the space of all pathogenic substances. I makes a space/time trade off in 
its detector set. At any time it maintains a set of randomly selected detectors. This sec is constantly 
changing. 
 
? Identity via Behavior – In cryptography, identity is proven through the use of a secret. The human 
immune system does not depend on secrets however. Identity is verified through the presentation of 
protein structures. These can be though of as the “running code” of the body. A model for this is 
discussed in [7] and will be looked at in the next chapter. 
 
? Anomaly Detection – The immune system has the ability to detect pathogenic substances that it has 
not encountered before. It is able to perform anomaly detection. The property of being able to 
recognize novel attacks is very important for any security system. This property is one of the key 
issues for this study and will be looked at into much greater detail in the next chapter. 
 
? Imperfect Detection – By accepting imperfect detection, the immune system increases the 
flexibility with which it can allocate resources. Resources are allocated according to the need and 
the extent of the threat posed by the detected intrusion. 
 
? The Numbers Game – The human immune system replicates detectors to deal with the replication 
of the cells of a pathogenic substance. It must do so as otherwise the pathogens would overwhelm 
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any defense. Computers are subject to a similar numbers game. Hackers freely trade newly found 
vulnerabilities and exploits. The success of one hacker can quickly lead to thousands of hosts being 
compromised. The analogy is that pathogens of the computer security world are playing the number 
game. However traditional systems are not. This is as proposed by [17], however it can be argued 
that the increasing of the number of identical defenses would not help in combating attackers. 
However, if the number of dynamically changing defenses is increased, then this could create a 
more favorable security scenario. 
 
These principles as posed to us from [17] are very good set of guidelines. It is not possible to fully translate 
these principles and analogize them in order to create methods that can be used to address the issues of 
information security, as the difference in architecture of the two hosts has to be taken into account, together 
with the different architecture between the types of threats posed to the two different hosts. However it is 
useful to try and create analogies up the the extent which they are possible and prove to be useful. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4  Detection & Prevention 
 
I would like to differ between these two different concepts at this point just to shed some more clarity in the 
matter of translating the design principles stated above. 
 
Detection, as defined by [22], is the process of discovering the existence or presence of something. In 
immunology the detection process is simply the recognition of a the presence of a pathogenic structure. 
Similarly in information security, the process of detection is simply making the user or the system aware of 
the presence of a threat. This is not preventing the threat from doing any damage. In the next step, the 
immune system does neutralize the threat, however this does not mean that the threat has not in fact done any 
damage. 
 
Prevention, as defined by [22], is the process through which a certain event is stopped from happening. 
From an immunological point of view, prevention is the process of neutralizing a pathogenic substance 
before this can pose a threat to the maintenance of homeostasis in the organism. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, homeostasis is not entirely stable and it has certain levels of threshold between which it is considered 
normal. Therefore, is is very unlikely that a pathogenic substance will do no damage at all. The important 
thing is that it does not do enough to move the homeostasis level beyond its thresholds. 
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This can be analogized to some extent in information security too. If a vulnerability is exploited and the 
system is able to detect the anomalous behavior it can stop the process from completing itself. However this 
is a very dangerous approach. 
 
In a computer security system, the optimal defense mechanism is the one of prevention. In immunology in 
contrast, detection is also acceptable after some damage has been done, as the body has the power to 
regenerate itself. 
 
However, there is a point to be noted here. In information security detection and prevention are two concepts 
that go together. An intrusion is detected and possibly prevented from carrying any undesired activity. Given 
that the detection is done at an early enough stage, the system would be able to prevent that intrusion from 
executing unwanted actions. The detection could also be done at the point where some desired action is 
performed, however, this is not necessarily bad. At least the detection would prepare a ground base for the 
full prevention in the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5  The Security Policy of the Immune System 
 
In the previous sections, namely section 2 and 3 of this chapter, the study has dealt with researching into 
concepts and general guidelines that have been developed by past and current research for the design and 
implementation of security systems. 
 
This study, as previously stated, is dealing with the issue of intrusion detection. Mainly with the detection of 
novel types of intrusions for which specific signatures do not exist. Before looking at the different types of 
architecture for a system that addresses the above issue I would like to once again, take a look at the 
principles individuated in the third section of this chapter. These principles are also mentioned in the 
dissertation of Steven Andrew Hoffmeyr [10]. This paper presents an immunological model for distributed 
detection. Some of the principles stated in this paper have been adapted in a different manner and I think they 
bring out some very key issues. I would like to concentrate over one in particular: 
 
? Implicit policy specification – “The definition of self used by the immune system is empirically 
defined. Self is implicitly defined by the “monitoring” of proteins that are currently in the body. The 
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advantage of this approach is that self is equivalent to the actual normal behavior, and not a 
specification of what normal behavior should be. In other words The immunity system does not 
suffer from the problem inherent in trying to correctly specify a security policy.” [10] 
 
As stated in the previous chapter, self, is defined as the set of protein structures presented by cells that do 
belong in the organism. The immune system knows what self is right from the beginning. Now, as stated 
above, self is not defined through a security policy, but it is constructed by monitoring structures that do 
belong there already. 
 
For the purpose of this study there are two key issues that need to be looked at into more detail and from an 
information security point of view. These issues are the very famous self/non-self discrimination and the 
negative selection. 
Creating a security system is not a very difficult issue, however, creating a both efficient and effective 
security system, is not an easy issue at all. The above mentioned issues are very well addressed in the 
immune system. In fact they are mechanisms which make this system achieve the level of perfection that it 
does. If we can find a way to translate them in terms of information security, this would be a great step 
towards the realization of a good security system. 
 
There are a different number of possible architectures and approaches towards the realization of the above 
goal. The next chapter provides an insight into the current research advancements for the application of 
negative selection and self/non-self discrimination in computer systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.6  Self & Non-Self In a Computer 
 
As stated in the first chapter, the human immune system makes use of two main techniques for providing the 
defense against pathogenic substances. The discrimination of what is self and non-self through using a 
number of agents that through the process on negative selection are made tolerant to self, in the sense that 
they will not detects self structures as and anomaly, and they will be able to detect what is non self. 
 
A number of techniques have been devised to imitate this approach in the world of information security. The 
next chapter will go into detail about the description of these techniques and their methods of work. 
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As stated in the previous section, the immune system makes use of a given knowledge about what is self and 
what is not. For any of the given architectures above, the main difficulty  would be the fact that we do not 
have a knowledge of what self is. Of course it can be argued that self will be what is defined as what is 
permitted by the security policy. However, as it is stated in [18]  the security policy does not cover all of non-
self in practice. Therefore a better method has to be created for the definition of self through which non-sels 
can be deduced [7] 
 
In the principles mentioned above form [17] one of them is identity via behavior. This poses an issue. How 
is it possible then to gather a set of data that would offer the knowledge needed in order to determine what 
self is. 
 
As an overview on the next chapter, this will go into looking a few negative selection techniques. Then some 
of the proposals for gaining a sense of self will be investigated. Also, a method devised for the self/non-self 
discrimination will be looked into. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.7  Misuse or Anomaly Detection 
 
This study is investigating into methods for the detection of intrusions through the use of methods modeled 
from the principles of the human immune system. It is of a great importance to classify what is meant by 
intrusion before continuing into the research of the methods. 
 
Intrusions in computer systems are the cause of undesired effects. As deducted from [8], these intrusions can 
be classified into intrusions through misuse and intrusions in the form of an anomaly.  
 
According to [8], misuse is referred to known types of intrusions that are tackled through the use of very 
specific methods such as signatures. These signatures detect the intrusions when they happen and do not let 
them carry any effect that they are supposed to do as intended by the payload of the intrusion. 
 
Anomalous intrusions refer to the types of intrusion for which a specific signature for it's the prevention of 
it's effect does not exist. These are the novel intrusions that have not been encountered in the past in order for 
them to respectively exist a signature that can be implemented in security systems for it's detection and 
prevention of the damage. So, for an anomaly, the signature is not known, but the execution of an anomalous 
intrusion would result in undesired effects, behavior other than the one initially intended [8]. 
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This study deals with solutions to the latter type of intrusions. 
 
The methods explored in the following part of this study are methods that try to determine anomalies through 
the knowledge of what is normal. This is a very good imitation and analogy to the defense mechanism used 
in the human body. 
 
It has to be noted that the detection of intrusion through signatures is quite good, given the rate of success. 
However, the performance of it is only noted when there are intrusions of a known kind and a specific 
signature exists for them. In the opposite case (where a signature is not known), the system becomes 
vulnerable. Therefore, a dynamic method of detection is needed.  This problem is the one will be looked into 
in the remainder of the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.8  Issues to be Addressed 
 
As looked into previously, the immune system uses the processes of self non/non-self discrimination for 
achieving the goal of defending the mechanism from pathogenic substances. It recognizes what is non-self 
through having a clear knowledge of what is self. Agents that recognize non-self are selected through the 
negative selection method. These agents recognize non self through a pattern recognition process of strictures 
in non-self considering a level of affinity. This can be interpreted a a matching process given a matching rule. 
 
The research presented in this chapter will deal with going into methods and techniques crated achieve a 
similar type of defense in computer systems. 
 
As previously stated, the immune system uses a definition of self that is empirically defined. We do not have 
such an option when dealing with computer systems. Self is not defined in such a manner from current 
methods of security policies that it can be used to generate agents that would recognize non self. 
 
The firs task of this chapter will be to investigate into the possibilities of generating a sense of self. Once this 
is created, the next steps can be taken. Imitating the methods of defense present in the immune system would 
include that self is given in some manner. Once that is given, then the generation of non-self detecting 
detecting techniques can be carried. 
One of the issues to be addressed in the creation of a solution for such a security system, would be to decide 
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what to analyze. The immune system analyzes structures of proteins in cells. For our system, what would 
these structures be? The analysis in this chapter will present ways of generating the self structures, in order to 
determine what the non self structures would be. 
 
The non-self detecting agents are created and selected through the negative selection process. A number of 
algorithms that analogize this task will be presented later in the chapter. However, these agents only bind to 
the non-self structures if a level of affinity, representing a threshold value, is met. This would be, in the 
context of information security, a matching rule, that would answer the following question. How 
complementary must the structures of of the agents and monitored elements be in order for any given element 
to be classified as non-self? The parameters set in the matching rule in this case would determine the level of 
affinity. 
 
Therefore, the issues to be tackled are: 
 
? How to define self. 
 
? Given the definition of self, how to generate non-self complementary structure. 
 
? Define the affinity needed between the non-self complementary structures created and the monitored 
structures for classification process during monitoring. 
 
The following parts of the chapter will present the reader with a series of methods and algorithms devised to 
address the above three issues points. 
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Chapter 3 
Current Research & Literature 
 
This chapter will present some research and insight into the current progress of information security in the 
area of intrusion detection methods inspired by the principles of the immune system. 
 
There are number of different names under which these systems can be found such Artificial Immune 
Systems, Computer Immune Systems, Hybrid Intrusion Detection Systems, Immune System Inspired 
Intrusion Detection Systems etc. 
 
In the following sections of this chapter I intend to present the reader with some information and detail about 
the current research, algorithms and methods translated form the principles of human immunology and used 
in the field of intrusion detection. 
 
The challenge of these systems is the determination of what can be classified as normal activity and what 
could be potentially harmful activity. In traditional intrusion detection and prevention systems, the only way 
that we are able to address the issues of information security is through systems that base they detection on a 
specific set of rules and only detect specific events. They rely on a predefined set of rules.. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
46
 
The ultimate goal is to design a method that can protect the system from previously encountered attacks 
through signature based anomaly detection (which is already a present and much used method) and also be 
able to detect attacks of any type that have not been encountered previously. 
 
The immune system of the human body does not rely on such rules. This system uses knowledge of what is 
allowed in order to prepare for handling what is not allowed. This does not imply the use of a static set of 
rules. The human immune system makes use of the empirical definition of self. The reader will be introduced 
to a method, currently used by researchers, for the establishment of the definition of self that is not based on 
preset static rules. 
 
A set of architectures will be presented in this chapter and it will be extracted from current research projects 
and papers. Following this, a more detailed analysis will be made, presenting methods and algorithms that 
simulate the principles of negative selection and self non self discrimination. 
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3.1  Architecture Proposals 
 
In the paper by Somayaji, Hoffmeyr and Forrest [17] four possible approaches towards an architecture for a 
computer immune system are presented. These are some ideas derived by a direct mapping between immune 
system components and current computer system architectures. Let us take a look at them as presented by the 
above mentioned paper. 
 
 
3.1.1 Four Analogized Architectures 
 
? Protecting static data – [17] This approach begins at the level of static malware. These malicious 
pieces of software infect programs and boot sectors by inserting instructions into them. Then upon 
running of an infected program, the malicious set of instructions will create an undesired and 
abnormal event. The consequences of this might be of any kind, between a hardly noticeable and 
total corruption of data and/or security of the system.  
In this approach self is defined as uncorrupted data. Programs that have not been injected with 
malicious instructions. 
Non-self, in contrast, is simply any change to self. A number of algorithms have been devised for the 
addressing of this problem. Some of these are directly inspired by biology and they are shown in in 
greater detail in [17]. 
However, judging from what is stated in [7], this architecture is not of great success, as the static 
data is not going to have any effect until it is run. 
 
? Protecting active processes on a single host – [17] The human immune system is primarily made 
up of cells. These cells monitor other cells and interact with them. This type of view tries to 
analogize this concept as follows: 
 
- every active process in a computer is a cell 
- a computer running multiple processes is a multicellular organism 
- a set of computers is a population of such organisms. 
 
The traditional security systems, such as passwords, permissions etc, can be viewed as playing the 
same role that the physical and physiological barriers and the innate immune system play. They are 
only effective towards previously encountered attacks. 
 
The implementation of an adaptive security system, analogized from the adaptive immune system, 
could include the implementation of a lymphocyte process, which with help from the kernel, is able 
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to query other processes, and see whether they are running normally. Analogizing from immunology, 
if a process is running abnormally (it is non-self), it is either damaged or under attack. The response 
of the lymphocyte process to such an event could be to slow, kill, suspend or restart the misbehaving 
process. To complete the analogy, each lymphocyte process, similarly to the cells of the 
lymphocytes of the immune system, could have a detector or set of detectors that are created 
randomly. The lymphocyte process should live for a short time and then be replaced by another 
process with different detectors, as it happens with lymphocytes of the immune system. This 
constant change will lead to no predefined location or control thread at which such process could be 
attacked. Lymphocyte processes that prove to be quite useful and indeed do prevent intrusions 
during their lifetime could be allowed to have a larger lifespan and/or allowed to “clone” by creating 
related processes with similar but more specific detector sets. The autoimmune responses can also 
be prevented by imitating the elimination of lymphocytes that bind to self structures as it happens in 
the thymus. 
 
 As mentioned before, in this type of architecture self is the normal behavior of precesses and non-
 self is the abnormal behavior of processes. This can be an intrusion in either privileged or  user 
processes. The ability of lymphocyte processes to replicate themselves makes the system  adaptable to user 
behavior and system software. However this can also be used as a  vulnerability by malicious users 
trying to train the precesses to be tolerant no non-self. 
 
 The level of security is also tunable. This can be done through an adjustment of the lifetime of 
 lymphocytes, and the adjustment of the number and quality of their detectors [5][6]. 
 The implementation of such an architecture will need a system for making the processes tolerant to 
 self structures. This is similar to the process undergone by the cells of the immune system in the  thymus. 
There is a number of papers that deal with presenting a model for this, and such issue will  be discussed in 
later section of this chapter. 
 
? Protecting a network of mutually trusting computers – [17] This approach has a very interesting 
view. Think of each computer on a network as an organ within an organism. Each process is still 
considered as a cell. An individual however, in this model of architecture, is a set of mutually 
trusting computers. In this model the innate immunity is constitute by traditional host based security 
mechanism like passwords and access controls, combined with network security mechanisms such 
as firewalls and Kerberos. Kerberos is a security system which uses a trusted entity to grant access 
to a certain server to a non trusted entity. For more details, the reader is directed to [23][18]. 
 
 The adaptive layer of the security system will be similar to the one in the former architecture. Kernel 
 assisted lymphocyte processes, however in this architecture the these processes can migrate between 
 computers and as an analogy to the lymphocyte cells in the human blood stream, make them mobile. 
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 One of the computes in this case, or indeed a set of them could act as the thymus in this  architecture. The 
duty of this set would be to create and propagate these lymphocyte processes each  of which searches 
for a specific pattern of abnormal behavior. If negative selection is used by these  lymphocyte processes, a 
centralized server to coordinate a response to a security breach is not  needed. The detecting process can 
take whatever action is necessary in this eventuality. A possibility  for it is to replicate itself and 
circulate to find similar patterns of behavior on other hosts. This  technique is inspired by the kill 
signal approach described in a paper by Kephart [15]. 
 
 “The similarity between this architecture and the previous one can be clearly seen. The difference in 
 this approach, is that in this case the lymphocyte processes are roaming in the network. According 
 to the source from which this approach is extracted [17], the process should be able to detect the  same set 
of anomalies, however, on the plus side, anomalies found on one machine can be  quickly eliminated form 
others.” 
  
 There is one extra requirement in comparison to the previous architecture and this is that this type od 
 system would heavily depend upon a robust framework for mobile agents. It also has the analogy 
 form the immune system of lymphocytes monitoring each other as well as other cells. In this 
 architecture, the lymphocyte processes are in fact processes running on each machine, so, given the 
 free roaming of these processes from machine to machine, these processes would also be able to  monitor 
each other. This will ameliorate also the danger of malicious mobile lymphocyte processes  that self 
replicate. Therefore, a malicious type of attack that menages to inject malicious instructions  in one of 
the processes, would quickly be stopped from other lymphocyte processes of the network. 
 
? Protecting a network of mutually trusting disposable computers – [17] This proposal for an 
architecture is moving the analogy up by another level. 
This approach is also a network based one. Here each of the computers is regarded a cell. The 
computers on the network are mutually trusting between each other. Host-based security would, in 
this ca, analogize the normal defense a cell has against attack. The innate immune system would, as 
before consist of the traditional methods such as firewalls and Kerberos. 
The implementation of the adaptive immune system can be achieved through creating a set of 
machines that actually perform the task of lymphocytes. In contract to the previous architecture, 
where processes running on each machine, would monitor the state, in this proposal we have 
separate machines with the task of doing this. 
These, so called, lymphocyte machines, would in this case monitor the state of other machines on 
the network and when an anomaly is detected, they must respond. The response could be anything 
from isolating the problematic machine, which would need to be done by a dynamic reconfiguration 
of the network, or just simply shut down or reboot the machine. If the source of the anomaly is 
outside the network, the lymphocyte machine could stand in for the victimized machine and battle 
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the attack. 
 
There are a set of problems that could be addressed in this architecture, such as denial of service 
attacks, network flooding and hardware failures These are not as well addressed by the other 
architectures as stated in [17]. The downside is that the requirements for the implementation of such 
an architecture are quite significantly large and difficult to achieve. The implementation would 
require an analogy of the epitope/protein structure at host level. This could be based and mirroring 
patterns of the machine's network traffic, or provide the behavioral patterns of the kernel of that 
machine. A further difficulty arises with the requirement of a dynamically configurable network. 
This is indispensable however for the lymphocyte machines in order for them to be able to isolate 
other machines in case an anomaly is found. Also, as in the previous architecture the need for a 
thymus analogy arises. 
There is also another issue, which I think is a key one and makes this architecture almost impossible 
to implement. This assumes, that hosts are interchangeable as it analogizes them with cells of the 
body. In the human body cells can be quickly replaced, however in a network it is not so feasible to 
just loose machines as they are hardly ever interchangeable and redundant. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.2  Limitations 
 
I would like to present the reader with some view on the limitation that are to be kept in mind in the 
design of the above presented architectures. These limitation are as by [17]. 
It is believed that the imitation of the ways nature deals with the detection of intrusions is a very 
inspiring approach that could be applicable information security. However, this may not be fully 
possible.  The reason for such a problem is that immunological solutions are not directly applicable to 
the computer systems that are present in nowadays technology. One other risk that is encountered is that 
these solutions might make us ignore the non-immunological solutions which would in some cases be 
more appropriate for tackling the issues that we are faced this in information security. Another risk that is 
posed by this imitation is the inheritance of the many assumptions of the immune system. A major one of 
these is the assumptions made in the process of self/non-self discrimination. 
It also has to be noted that in information security, as pointed out in the precious chapter we are faced 
with the five main issues of confidentiality, integrity, availability, correctness and accountability. 
Whereas the immune system has only one issue to tackle in its approach. Survival of the organism. 
According to [17] this can be thought of as a combination of integrity and availability. 
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Viewing the memory of the immune system as a type of audit trail, might be looked as an analogy of 
accountability, however the immune system, only holds enough information about a new attack so that it 
can be recognized in the future. It does not hold information about the source of the attack. 
Correctness and confidentiality are totally irrelevant to survival. Correctness, from an information 
security point of view, means that a certain piece of software meets the specified requirements. Immune 
systems are not formally specified systems. This makes the definition of these systems as “CORRECT” 
not possible. We define something as correct when it meets the required specification. If there is no 
specification, correctness can not be ensured. 
In the context of confidentiality, this is not an issue at all for the immunity. The immune system is not 
concerned what so ever with the protection of secrets or privacy. This is definitely the largest limitation 
to be kept in mind in these architectures. [17] 
 
Passwords, access control and good design are still needed for dealing with the issues of information 
security. As mentioned in the previously presented architectures, these measures can be analogized to the 
innate immunity present in our organisms. 
The focus of this study towards adaptive measures of security does not imply that the traditional methods 
should be replaced. This type of security should instead be added as a new layer to make sure that the 
traditional methods are not being breached. 
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3.2  The Methods and Algorithms 
 
Analogizing form the problems faced by the immune system of distinguishing self from non-self, as 
described through self/non-self discrimination in the first chapter of this study, most of the problems faced by 
information security can also be seen as a discrimination issue. Self are elements such as authorized users and 
actions, uncorrupted genuine data, original source code etc. Whereas, non-self would be elements such as 
intruders, viruses, worms and all other malicious attacks. [13] 
 
As described in the first chapter, the methods of self/non-self discrimination can be divided into specific and 
non-specific, somewhat like the methods used in information security. We have specific methods such as 
signatures for virus checking and security analysis tools that use methods specific to one type of threat or 
vulnerability. Also there are non-specific methods such as good code hygiene,  encryption, firewalls, etc, that 
are methods which tackle a wide variety of threats. However, the high specificity is not of high importance to 
this study. The concept of most relevance is the dynamical property of the immune system. The ability to 
create its own security system and adapt it to combat unknown attacks. 
 
As stated in [24] in the security of present day we largely rely on methods of security for the prevention of 
security breaches. The problem with these methods is that they are quite passive. They play a role of 
prevention towards the intrusion of non-self elements into systems. These methods are unable to detect 
intrusions that are in progress in a system. These methods however are not inefficient. If we are to measure 
the efficiency of these methods by the rate of their success towards meeting the purpose they are designed 
for, then it can be said that they are very successful [24]. They are very specific to one specific type of 
intrusion and they provide a preventative measure towards that specific intrusion.  These specific methods 
however, such as the ones through signatures for example, rely on non static recognition for the detection and 
prevention of intrusion. If an attack or attacker would be to change the intrusion technique, then the method, 
being static, would not have a very large success in the detection and prevention of this intrusion.  These 
methods, or indeed the creators and menages of these methods and systems, have a very hard time keeping up 
with the constantly evolving and dynamic nature of attacks from malicious agents. 
 
The problem with these systems is also the fact that they strictly rely on static rules for the detection of an 
intrusion and one rule is strictly a patch for one single possible breach of security. Due to this it is very hard 
to devise rules and patches for every hole in a computer system, especially keeping in mind the size of these 
in the present day. 
 
As previously stated, the immune system uses a definition of self that is empirically defined. We do not have 
such an option when dealing with computer systems. Self is not defined in such a manner from current 
methods of security policies that it can be used to generate agents that would recognize non self. 
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The first task of this chapter will be to investigate into the possibilities of generating a sense of self. Once this 
is created, the next steps can be taken. Imitating the methods of defense present in the immune system would 
include that self is given in some manner. Once that is given, then the generation of non-self detecting 
detecting techniques can be carried. 
 
One of the issues to be addressed in the creation of a solution for such a security system, would be to decide 
what to analyze. The immune system analyzes structures of proteins in cells. For our system, what would 
these structures be? The analysis in this chapter will present ways of generating the self structures, in order to 
determine what the non self structures would be. 
 
The non-self detecting agents are created and selected through the negative selection process. A number of 
algorithms that analogize this task will be presented later in the chapter. However, these agents only bind to 
the non-self structures if a level of affinity, representing a threshold value, is met. This would be, in the 
context of information security, a matching rule, that would answer the following question. How 
complementary must the structures of the agents and monitored elements be in order for any given element to 
be classified as non-self? The parameters set in the matching rule in this case would determine the level of 
affinity. 
 
Therefore, the issues to be tackled are: 
 
? How to define self. 
 
? Given the definition of self, how to generate non-self complementary structure. 
 
The following parts of the chapter will present the reader with a series of methods and algorithms devised to 
address the above three issues points. 
 
 
 
N.B. I will produce the analysis as shown in the papers in question for each one and where needed a 
brief summary will be made to illustrate a quick view for each one of them. For more details, the 
reader is asked to refer to the appropriate paper as mentioned in the references. 
It has to be noted that the methods and algorithms presented below are the ground work for the 
development of the system. These are applicable to any of the architectures mentioned previously.  
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3.2.1  Defining Self 
 
In the development of a security system for computers that is based on the methods that the immune system 
uses, it is important to be able to get a good sense of the self element in order to proceed into the 
classification of non-self. 
 
What we are trying to do, is the discrimination of what is a normal behavior in a computer system and what is 
not normal should not be permitted. The question is what can be monitored in order to gain such knowledge. 
 
In [7] we are presented with a method for defining a sense of self through the monitoring of behavior in 
system calls. The monitoring of program code in disk storage is of little use. This is not going to change until 
it is run. Intrusions are caused by running processes that execute system call 
 
As studied in Computer Security [18] and stated in the [7], system calls are a mean of communication in the 
form of a low level function so high level processes such as executable commands can communicate with the 
lower level kernel of an operating system. They perform system actions through the kernel for example on 
behalf of the user. These are operations such as I/O calls for a file like read(), write() etc. Each of them has a 
slightly different atomic task, however their combination  comes to a much different function. Depending on 
the complexity, applications initiate between tens and thousands of these per execution. From a security 
prospective according to [21], they are ideal for providing a detailed view for providing information on a 
process or system. It can be argued that these are too low level, however the paper in question, clearly states 
that they provide a good base for the “empirical” definition of self that we need. 
 
Each process has a set of implicitly specified set of sequences of system system calls that can be produced, 
determined by the set of possible execution paths of the program. Normal execution will produce a certain 
number of subsets of this set. For nowadays applications, considering their size and complexity these sets 
will be very large. Every execution, furthermore will generate an entirely different set. However it has been 
noticed as stated in [7] that short ranges of these calls are consistent. This can be used in a definition of 
normal behavior, or self. 
 
The process, is to initially scan the traces of the normal behavior in order to build a database of patterns for 
normal behavior. Entries of this database can be then used to monitor through the sets created by processes 
running and look for patterns that do not appear in the database of normal behavior. According to the affinity 
determined by the chosen matching rule, these will then be discriminated as self or non-self. 
3.2.1.1  Building the Self Database 
 
 
Being given a set of sequence calls for any given process, the method, as explained in [7], uses a window of 
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size k + 1 and slides it across the sequence of system calls and records the calls that fall within the window. 
The following example should provide an illustration of this. 
 
We have k = 3 and a sequence of system calls that is a definition of normal behavior. 
 
 open, read, mmap, mmap, open, getrlimit, mmap, close 
 
Sliding the window across the sequence, the first call is recorded and the calls that follow it in the next 
positions up to the size of the window. The first generated window would be as follows 
 
 
Call Position 1 Position 2 Position 3 
open read mmap mmap 
read mmap mmap  
mmap mmap   
 
 
Whenever a call occurs more than once, there is a number of possibilities as to what it can be followed by. 
These possibilities are recorded in the database and the repetitions of entries in respect to the call column and 
the position column are eliminated. From the above sequence, the database would look as follows. 
 
 
Call Position 1  Posiiton 2 Position 3 
open read mmap mmap 
 getrlimit  close 
read mmap mmap open 
mmap mmap open getrlimit 
 open getrlimit mmap 
 close    
getrlimit mmap close  
close    
 
 
When the database of normal patterns is completed, the same windowing method is used, however this time 
for comparison against the database of self. This will determine whether the sequence of system call differs 
from the one defined in the self database. 
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3.2.1.2  Analyzing with Respect to Knowledge of Self 
 
 
Suppose the following sequence is is being monitored and compared against the database in the previous 
example 
  
 open, read, mmap, open, open, getrlimit, mmap, close 
 
According to the self database there are 4 cases of behavior that can be classified as abnormal. according to 
the  self database, we have 4 cases that are not present in this sequence. The abnormalities that are not present 
in the self database are: 
 
? open is not followed by open at position 3 
? read is not followed by open at position 2 
? open is not followed by open at position 1 
? open is not followed by getrlimit at position 2 
 
The decision of  is made according to the affinity settings that we have decided to implemented and set in the 
matching rule. 
 
However, in this prospect, we are just defining self and using it directly for the analysis. The immune system 
does not make use of self in order to decide upon the presence of non-self. The procedure it follows is that by 
using the knowledge of self, it creates detectors that are complementary to non-self in order to combat them. 
And then, once a match has been established between these detector and the non-self structure, according to 
the affinity level, that is predefined as a point of threshold, it makes the classification decision for the 
detected factor in order to decide towards it's elimination or not. 
 
What the previous analysis lacks is a method for the generation of structures that are complementary to an 
unacceptable sequence of system calls. Given the self set, it is possible to generate a set of structures that are 
not self, but are complementary to non self. And, given a way to determine the affinity level needed, the 
threshold, threes structures, acting as detectors, would be able to detect non self sequences of system calls 
and act accordingly to what is specified that should be done in this case. This could be restarting the process, 
killing the process or any series of actions that is desired in the implementation of the system. 
 
However, the previous analysis has defined a way that allows the gaining of knowledge of self that is not 
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predefined by a set of rules, like it is in the traditional methods of security such as policies. The immune 
system holds, in some way, an empirical definition of self. This is due to many factors, which are not relevant 
to this study, however, as a quick note, it has to be remembered that a human body and all the organs and the 
elements in it, evolve from a single cell, which holds the DNA, that is transferred to all other cells. Self is 
defined in some manner in the DNA. The system is aware of is right form the start. 
It is not possible, due to the differences in construct and working, to have such a definition of self in 
information security. The previously introduce process however has helped us gain a sense of self through 
defining normal behavior. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.1.3  Loss of Information 
 
When the database for the definition of self is generated, there is a problem that is being encountered. We are 
essentially splitting the whole sequence of system calls into a set of subsequences. This will produce a loss of 
information in the context of what the entire initial sequence was. The method does not assume that there is a 
dependency between the generated substrings. The choice of the window must be picked carefully in order to 
minimize this loss of information.  
 
The reader will be later introduced to an analysis for the calculation of  loss of information that will aid in the 
decision for the parameters to be used in such a method. However, there is one problem to be noted here. The 
loss of information analysis through the splitting of the data  as extracted from [6] and [5], assumes the use of 
a windowing method, where the window of size k is not moved by one position at a time. In this analysis the 
window is moved by k positions at a time. This would create a much smaller database and create a larger loss 
of information as the windows would be totally independent of each other.  
 
I have not been able to find an analysis that assumes a k window that is moved by one position at a time, 
therefore, the assumption that the window will be moved by k positions will be made. 
 
It can be argued that a large amount of storage is needed for this database. This entails a careful choice of 
parameters for the process and a technique for this will be introduced later. 
 
3.3  Anomaly Detection Method  
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As examined previously in the first chapter, the immune system accomplishes the process of self/non-self 
discrimination through the monitoring of patterns in the strings of proteins presented in the epitopes of 
cellular structures. Analogizing from this, in information security self could be users logged in to the system, 
were detectors monitor random parts of their audit trail. This analysis is presented by [6][5]. 
 
Receptors of lymphocyte cells in the immune system bind to antigenic structures through patterns in shapes. 
This simulation is achieved in this model through a “matching rule” which acts on random strings over a 
given alphabet, by deciding weather the detector matches the string. There are a number of matching 
algorithms that can be used to get the result on which the decision will be based. 
 
The choice of matching rule is very important, and to date, research has made use of the the “r contiguous-
bits” matching rule.[6] Here, two strings are considered to match to each other in the case that at least r 
contiguous positions in the strings are identical. R is the parameter of the matching rule. For example, for r = 
5 we will have 
 
 Case A: 
 01000111000101101 
 11101011000010010 
 
 Case B: 
 01010100111001010 
 01010001000110010 
 
The two strings in case A, above, are said to match as there are substrings of 5 contiguous bits that are 
identical in both of them. This is not the the case in case B. Therefore, under the rule presented above there is 
no match in case B. 
 
 
The choice of this rule in as stated, [6] was arbitrary. However, it was a decision made upon the fact that in 
[13] the use of this rule was successful in the simple detection of viruses. The rule is however used here for 
illustrative and explanatory purposes. In real life, other more efficient and more complex matching rules 
might be used. 
 
Analogizing from the generation of B-cells in immune system, the generation of detector stings can be 
random. The strings that match any of the self strings, based upon the decision rule, should be eliminated as it 
is done in the negative selection of the immune system. The strings that remain will be the detector set to be 
used for the detection of non-self strings. This set of strings will form a repertoire that is named R. The 
process is repeated until a sufficient number of strings is generated to achieve the desired level of security. 
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The next figure (Figure 3.2) is a visual illustration of what should happen.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Constructing a set of detectors R for a set of self strings S, using 
generate-and-test (algorithm discussed later). The matching rule used here is “r-
contiguous-bits” with r = 2. The strings in Ro are generated at random. The ones that 
match any of the strings in S are rejected. The ones that do not will form the 
repertoire of detectors R Extracted form [6] 
 
 
The problem of computational time arises when looking at the power and time needed to generate a sufficient 
set of detectors. Resources are wasted as many of these strings will be eliminated. Optimally we would like 
to be able to generate the end set immediately without going into the process of elimination. Later some 
algorithms will be presented as a solution to this problem. 
 
The next figure (Figure 3.2) will provide a visual display of the matching process in sets of data strings and 
how they relate to each other. 
Figure 3.2 provides a visual representation between the strings in question [6]. String space U and detector 
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space Ud are drawn separately for clarity, even though in this paper U = Ud.  
 
The following notation is as presented in [6] and has to be kept in mind throughout the parts of this chapter: 
 
? Matches(P) = Q – means: “P matches Q” if Q contains all the strings matched by any detector in P. 
? MatchedBy(Q) = P – means: “Q is matched by P” if P contains all the detectors matching any 
string in Q. 
? Matching probability Pm : given a matching rule, probability for a match to happen between a 
randomly chosen string and detector 
? Failure probability Pf : probability that a single random non-self string will not be matched by any 
of the detectors in R. 
? We write NX for the size (cardinality) of a set X. In particular, NS is the size of the self set and NR is 
the detector set size. 
 
? Pf  denotes the probability of failure that NR detectors have in detecting an intrusion. 
? NS is the number of self strings. 
? NR is the number of detector strings . 
? NU is the total number of strings. 
? Pm is the probability of a match between two random strings. 
 
 
Given a set of self strings S belonging to U, the goal is to find a detector set R belonging to U that matches as 
many of the non-self strings in N as possible (N = U-S), without matching any of the self strings in S. The 
detectors in R are chosen from the set of candidate detectors C, consisting of all strings that do not match any 
string in S (i.e., C = U - MatchedBy(S)). If we were to include all candidate detector strings in R, we would 
be able to detect all non-self strings in set N`, which may or may not be equal to N. Generally, only a small 
subset of candidate detectors will be included in R, allowing us to detect all non-self strings in D (with D 
belonging to N` belonging to N). Failure probability Pf = ND/NN, or Pf ≈ ND/NU if NS < NU. [6] 
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Figure 3.2: Relationships between the subsets of string space U and detector space 
Ud. String space is partitioned into self strings S and non-self strings N. Candidate 
detectors (C) are those that do not match any string in S. The detector set R is a 
subset of the candidate detectors. Non-self strings can be further subdivided in 
detectable non-self strings (N´) and holes (H = N - N´, not labeled). Detectable non-
self strings can be detected (D) or not (F = N´ - D, not labeled), depending on the 
choice of R. Extracted form [5]. 
 
 
Further reading will introduce the reader to methods devised for the process of negative selection of the 
detectors. The methods will be described assuming that a definition of self does exist. This has been dealt 
with previously and assuming that a sense of self is gained, these methods are introduced. 
 
The process of anomaly detection, assuming that self is defined, has the following advantages in comparison 
to the traditional menthols of intrusion detection. Theses are stated in [6]. 
 
? There is no need for a prior knowledge of intrusion as opposed to the traditional methods that 
rely on non dynamic methods.. 
 
? Detection is probabilistic but tunable. The human immune system does not hold a set of 
lymphocytes of such size, that all non-self structures can be recognized. Similarly, in the case of 
computer security, it is not possible to maintain a set of detectors that cover all non-self strings. The 
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set is given a limit in size according to a predefined failure probability that has been deemed 
acceptable. 
 
? The detection scheme is inherently distributable. Small sections of the protected object can be 
checked separately. Different sites can have independently created sets of detector sets for the same 
object, and the detectors in the detector set can be run independently. Communication between sets 
is not needed until an anomaly is detected. This makes this a promising tool for use in networked 
environments or an architecture with autonomous agents such as the one presented in [6]. 
 
? Detection is local. Classical change detection methods, such as checksums or hash functions, need 
the entire data set o be checked at once. The method presented here allows for a small section of the 
data to be checked and when an anomaly is found, it can be localized to the strings that the detectors 
is checking [6]. 
 
? The set of detectors at each site can be unique. This analogizes the diversity of the immune 
system between different individuals of the population. A failure in one site does not mean that the 
other sites would fail too. This generates a level of diversity, therefore, if one site is attacked and 
penetrated successfully, other sites will not be vulnerable to the same intrusion [6]. 
 
? The set of self strings are the set of detectors are mutually protective, meaning that they protect 
each other from changes. Also detection is local. A string or detector that has been changed can be 
pinpointed locally [6]. 
 
A comment that can be made at this point given the above described method would be to just use checksums. 
[6] It has to be said at this point that the use of checksums is just a very specific case of the above 
description. With checksums there is only one object that is protected and one single detector, the checksum. 
Matching rule consists of analyzing the result obtained from calculating the checksum of the protected object 
in comparison to the one we already have form before. 
 
The above method can be considered as a generalized checksum method. Given the appropriate choice of 
parameter, it can protect NS (N number of self strings) files of file sections using NR (N number detectors in 
the detector repertoire) of checksums. The detection would be, in this case, distributed and localized. There is 
the advantage of tunability through which, it can be used as an detection method for anomalies in dynamic 
environments. Admittedly, this is a very large advantage, as in the case of its application to intrusion 
detection, it is unreasonable to look for single bit changes. 
 
A noticeable issue to be considered in the implementation of such a system is the degree of freedom in 
parameter choice. In the next sections we will be looking at analysis that is aimed to the derivation of 
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boundaries for these parameters. 
 
Further sections will also deal with the presentations of some algorithms that have been designed for the 
purpose of efficient generation of detector sets as presented in [5]. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.1  Some Analytical Points 
 
In the paper [6] that is being studied in this part of the chapter, the theoretical analysis mentioned above is 
divided into three sections that deal with three key issues for negative selection in the context of anomaly 
detection 
As presented in [6] these issues are: 
 
? Deriving an estimate of the amount of information that is being lost by the division of a data stream 
into unordered and independent strings.  
 
? Deriving a set of bounds for the size of the detector set to be generated. As mentioned previously, a 
complete set can not be maintained due to computational power issues. The choices should be made 
according to an acceptable probability that a detector will match a non-self string. This is the 
probability previously mentioned Pm. 
 
? The issue on non detectable non-self strings will be also shown. This will illustrate the fact that, 
independently from the size of the detector set, there will always be a set of non-self strings that is 
not possible to detect. I would ask the reader at this point to keep this part in mind as it will be 
shown later that this issue is also possible to tackle. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.1.1  Splitting the Data Stream 
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First I would like to familiarize the reader with the concept of entropy. As defined by [25], entropy is a 
numerical measure of the uncertainty of an outcome. Keeping this in mind let us go into the analysis. 
 
As previously mentioned, when gaining a sense of self, through the windowing process, when the database is 
created, we are splitting a large sequence or string S into multiple subsets or subsequences NS of that initial 
string. 
The method presented previously for the detection of anomalies works over random and unordered sets of 
strings. In real life, data sets, such as files behavioral patterns of process, sequences of system calls or even 
running programs are not unordered. For the method to be applied in a real life situation, the data that is to be 
analyzed must be preprocessed. This means that the data must be split into strings of a certain size over an 
alphabet (in this example as by [6], the alphabet is binary). A negative consequence of this splitting is that 
some of the internal structure of the data, that could be essential to make the detection more efficient, is lost. 
Because we would like to gain as much information about self as possible, the information loss must be 
minimized. The analysis presented here assumes a binary alphabet. The method does however work for larger 
alphabets too [6]. 
 
It is stated in this paper that, the information lost by splitting a stream Ŝ into a set of unordered string S is 
equal to the amount of information (in bits) we would need to be given in order to reconstruct the original 
stream from the unordered set. This can be denoted H(Ŝ | S). This is the conditional entropy of  Ŝ given S. In 
information theory this quantity is known as the doubt. This because it represents the amount of information 
about  Ŝ that is missing in the encoding S. For a given string of length l, a stream Ŝ of LS bits will split up 
into a set S of NS l-bit self strings. In most cases not all of the divided strings will be unique, therefore  S is 
really a multi set. Suppose that we are faced with k unique l-bit strings, where each string si appears Ni times. 
To express this in a mathematical manner we would have the following formula: 
 
  
 
 Given this set of substrings, the original stream will be one of the possible following arangements: 
 
 
 Because we are not given information about the initial data stream, we must assume that each of the 
 above arrangements is a possibility and all arrangements have the same probability of being the  original 
stream. The following equation [6], in this case shows the amount of information in  bits lost in this 
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splitting process. 
 where ΔI represents the amount in bits of the lost information. 
 If Sterling's approximation of the factorial function is applied to the above equation, we will have 
 the following shown. This is similar to the reasoning in [6] 
 
  
 In the above equation, H(Ni¦NS) represents the entropy associated with the relative frequencies of the 
 occurrence of the sting in S. Taking this through a transformation through a base 2 logarithm, which  is 
the size of our alphabet, this becomes: 
 
  
 “Or in the form of a big Ə notation” [6]: 
 As by [25], thin notation represents “The theoretical measure of the execution of an algorithm.” 
 
  
 
 The reader will recall that we are trying to get a bound on the lost information. According to the  above 
equations [6] this will be represented as follows, where ΔI1. 
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To explain it now in simple words, what the above analysis is trying to show is that if we measure the 
average entropy per bit on the sting S for different lengths l of this string, the information loss could be 
minimized by choosing the value of l in such a way that the entropy per bit is minimized.  
A careful choice needs to be made in the process of choosing l, because if l is small, the entropy is minimal 
too, however if l is too large, beyond the point where most strings in S are unique, this will also reduce the 
entropy as it reduces the number of strings in S. But, choosing a large l will make the generation of detectors 
difficult in terms of space and time required for the generation process. Computational expenses will be too 
heavy. 
 
I would like to drag the reader's attention to the following diagrams as  shown in [6][5] for some visual 
clarity. 
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Figure 3.3. In the previous figures, it is shown, the entropy of the set of strings 
obtained by splitting a binary into l-bit strings. The dotted lines indicate the 
envelope within which H must fall. This is delimited by H/l = 1 and H = log2(NS). 
Figure (a) shows the entropy H(Ni/NS) of the resulting set of strings. Figure (b) 
shows the entropy per bit of these strings which is proportional to  ΔI1. Figure 
extracted from [6] [5] 
 
As extracted from [6] the previous figure shows changes in the entropy with respect to l for a real data file.  
 
This is what is said in [6]: 
 
The data chosen was an emacs binary (GNU emacs v19.25.2 SGI binary, 3.2MB). The file was split up into 
strings of length l=1 (single bits), 2, 4, and multiples of 8 (i.e. at byte boundaries) up to 16 bytes long. For 
each value of l, the entropy of the resulting set of strings was calculated. Figure 3.3(a) shows clearly that 
there are minima in the entropy at multiples of 4 bytes, corresponding to the 32- bit RISC instruction used to 
compile the binary. The values plotted here at 8-bit intervals are themselves local minima as well: for 
intermediate values of l the entropy would be much higher, because this corresponds to cutting up the data at 
nonbyte boundaries, ignoring the natural byte structure present in the data. The entropy per bit plotted in 
Figure 3.3(b) is proportional to DI1 (apart from a constant factor LS). This graph is uniformly decreasing, so 
in order to minimize information loss for this data we would want to choose l as high as our other constraints 
allow, with a preference for multiples of 4 bytes. Note that most of the gain occurs at lower string lengths, so 
increasing string length beyond 64 bits (8 bytes) gives little extra improvement. 
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The calculation for the information loss by splitting the data at l-bit boundaries is a widely applicable concept 
that can be used in any method that transforms data into sets of unordered strings. It would particularly hold 
for methods that take into account the frequency of  occurrence of the self strings.  
Now, because this method ignores the frequency of concurrence of each unique l-bit sting si, we have a 
second source of information loss. Assuming that NS is known, if given the set of unique k strings in S(s1, s2, 
....., sk), there are: 
 
 
possible ways of assigning the values for Ni, in a way for them to sum up to NS, and reconstructing the 
unordered multiset S. Again assuming no prior knowledge of the contents of the data stream, if each of those 
assignments is equally likely, the amount of information loss through ignoring the frequencies of the strings 
is shown by  ΔI2 as follows: 
 
 
ΔI2 would generally be small compared to ΔI1 from before and is ignorable in practice. If  ΔI2 is to be 
minimized, this can be done by minimizing NS, through choosing a large l. Duplicate strings would be 
reduced and therefore the loss of information through the ignoring of them. This however would cause an 
increase in  ΔI1 because of the increase in H(Ni/NS). 
 
However, I would like to make a point here. I do not see why entropy loss should be the best way of choosing 
the size of l. Why not choose l in such a way to eliminate the concurrency of strings for example. This would 
immediately create a more diverse database, without redundant entries. However, it always has to be 
remembered that the choice of l must be done with computational expense in mind. 
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3.3.1.2  A Summery of the Splitting Process 
 
In the previous section, the reader has been presented with a rather large and overwhelming amount of 
information and mathematical analysis about the whole procedure of how the given data segment should be 
processed in order to be split into independent strings. I would like to try and summarize it in a few simple 
words now without using mathematical formulas and equations simply to make the understanding easier. 
 
There are two main thing to be kept in mind: 
 
1. When dealing with processes that require a large amount of computational power and time, things 
have to be kept simple to minimize the use of resources. How good is an intrusion detection system 
that increases the time of any process running through the analysis it does by many fold, takes a lot 
of memory on both the hard drive and the RAM. 
 
2. The splitting process described in the previous section assumes that no record is kept by the detector 
system about the previous state of the data set. Once the data given is split into strings, that is all the 
system has for the analysis. Before the splitting process occurs, these strings form a sequence that  in 
some way creates a dependence between the substrings. The splitting creates a loss of information in 
the context of the previous amount of the data. Through the splitting we are loosing information 
about what is happening in these exchanges. 
 
What is trying to be done in the above section is the derivation of a suitable length for the substrings into 
which the data set is being split. This split should be done in such a way that the loss of information that 
results from this splitting process is minimized. This is the information loss minimization concept mentioned 
above. 
The splitting needs to be done in such away that the information loss is minimizer, therefore the importance 
of choosing the right size for l through the methods shown above. Also, in needs to be done in such a way to 
avoid the over repletion of the same sequences as this would not be beneficial to the computational time 
needed and also it would not be beneficial to the entropy either. 
The equations seen above try to find the correct size for the measure l in the following manner. Given a 
choice of l, and the substrings constructed with this length, there are a number of possible reconstructions 
that can be done through the reordering of these strings in order to get the original data. The larger the 
number of these possible scenarios of reconstructions, the larger the information loss will be. The size of the 
length of strings in the division process needs to be chosen in such a way that the trade off between this 
number of reordering and the computational expense is acceptable.  
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3.3.1.3  Detector Set Size 
 
As mentioned earlier, it is not feasible to maintain a detector set that covers all possible non-self strings 
derived from the data that is being analyzed. The detector strings are randomly generated. A way of 
generating these strings is needed in order to make the set as efficient as possible while trying to minimize 
the size of it for computational expense purposes. 
 
The theory presented below is extracted form [5]. It will be presented as it is shown in the paper and 
following this is will male a brief summarization of it in simple words to explain the process. 
It is possible to derive theoretical lower bounds for the needed number of detectors needed. This is an 
important factor in the decision of parameter setting. So, what is the number of detectors needed to generate a 
specified failure rate Pf? The answer to this question will affect time needed for the generation of these 
detectors, storage space, amount of non-self space covered by each detector, etc. 
 
 
Pm will denote the probability that a randomly chosen detector and a non-self string with match according to 
the matching rule used [5]. From this, a first lower bound, NR, can be derived. In the best case, we can spread 
the detectors apart in such a way so that no two detectors match the same non-self string. The amount of 
string space covered by NR detectors is then PmNRNU. This needs to be at least as big as (1-Pf)NU, so that it 
can cover enough non-self string for a failure probability of Pf, so, ignoring NS with respect to NR: 
 
 
A further lower bound can be derived based on the amount of information about S that can be stored in R. A 
set of detectors R constructed for a given set of self strings S can be viewed as a message encoding 
information about this S self set. Given a "perfect" detector set R`, that is, a set of detector strings that exactly 
recognizes all non-self strings, it would be possible to reconstruct the original self set S (by checking for each 
string in the string space whether it is detected by any detector in R´). Therefore, this set R` would have to 
contain at least the same information as the original set S. By calculating the information content of the 
original file of self strings it is possible to get an absolute lower bound on the information content, and thus 
on the size, of the detector set. For a random self test, the information content will be of the same order as it's 
size in bits. The meaning of this is that the perfect detector set R` would have to have approximately the same 
bit size as the self set S. This is not an acceptable assumption in the case of very large self sets. 
 
The problem above, can be alleviated through an allowance in the sense of an acceptable amount of error in 
the self/non-self discrimination performed by the detectors. In this analysis it is assumed that  a fraction Pf of 
the non-self strings are not matched by the detectors. Denoting U as the total string space, and NU = ¦U¦, the 
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assumption allows at most Pf(NU – NS) non-self strings left undetected. This is an allowance for false 
negatives, however false positives, self strings being detected as non-self is not allowed. 
Given that an exact encoding of the self set S is not required, means a smaller information content therefore, 
a smaller detector set. 
 
Choosing the self strings from the set of possible string U then there are: 
 
 
possible self sets of size NS. Assuming (i) that the set of self strings is chosen at random out of the set of all 
possible strings, therefore meaning that they are independent, it means that any of those strings is equally 
likely. The average information content, or the entropy of the self test of size NS will be: 
 
 
Given a detector set R constructed for this self test S, we could try and reconstruct S from R. Similar process 
to the one described earlier. Given that R has been constructed with a measure of fault tolerance in mind, it is 
not feasible or possible to reconstruct S exactly. Instead we would get a set S` that contains all the original 
self strings and in addition it will also contain a set of unmatched non self strings of Pf(NU – NS). 
 
In assumption (i) made above we have stated that the strings are independent of each other. A second 
assumption is made by the analysis at this point (ii). Given S` we have no knowledge of of which subject of  
NS strings constitutes the original set S. The missing amount of information about S, which is not in the 
encoding R can be denoted by H(S¦R). This is the amount of information that would be gained if S was given 
to us when we already have R. 
 
The assumptions made above, (i) and (ii) make us deduce that any subset of size NS taken form the set S` of 
size NS + Pf(NU – NS), is equally likely to be the original self set S. Considering the following: 
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The difference between H(S) and H(S¦R), where H(S) is the information is S and H(S¦R) is the information 
about S missing in R, shows the information of S that is preserved in R. This is called the Mutual 
information of S and R. It is denotes by I(S;R). This can be worked in single details through the use of the 
following equation: 
 
 
The analysis at this point makes a third and last assumption (iii). This assumption is as follows:  
 
PfNU > NS and therefore, NU > NS. 
 
The above assumption simplifies the above equation as this: 
 
 
Since R needs to contain this much information in the least, this is a lower bound on the size of the detector 
set in bits. If the detectors are strings of length l over an alphabet of size m the required size of the detector 
repertoire NR is given by: 
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In assumptions (i) and (ii) this analysis states that the self strings are independent from each other. This is, 
almost always, not be the case in real life. Both assumptions will be affected by this issue. Assumption (i), 
that self stings are independent, led to the formula H(S) as it was allowed to assume that all self sets are 
equally likely. This will hardly ever be the case in a real life situation. Real life data is most likely going to 
show some kind of structure. This will lead to a larger similarity between self strings than random strings. 
This fact is something that will have an effect on H(S) as the real data will probably form only one of the 
subsets of all possible sets. Any single real data set may contain less information than a random one. 
However, by having only one data set, it is not possible to analyze how likely this set is and how much 
information it contains. A more high-level knowledge is required for the determination of the entropy of one 
single set. If this information is at hand, it could also lead to a smaller encoding, a smaller H(S). 
 
The effect that non independent self strings would have in the second assumption (ii) are a bit unclear 
according to both [5][6] 
As stated by both of these papers, if the Pf(NU – NS) undetected non-self strings in S` are dependent we might 
find some information about which subset NS of strings are most likely to be the original self file S and 
therefore H(S¦R) can be smaller. The character of the non-self strings that are left undetected will be 
dependent on the matching rule and repertoire generation algorithm used in a specific case. 
 
The third and final assumption (iii) made states that PfNU > NS. It would be generally acceptable to assume 
that at least  NU > NS. Should this not be the case then almost all possible detector strings would match to at 
least one self string and most non-self strings would in fact be undetectable holes. 
This assumption holds depending on the acceptable rate of failure set. Take a look at the table below. It 
illustrates this theoretical lower bound for NR as a function of string length l for a data stream of one million 
bits. Note that for a tenfold decrease in failure rate we only need a twofold increase in the number of 
detectors. 
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Table 3.1: lower bounds of NR for a 1 Mbit long data set for different sting lengths. 
As seen in [5][6] 
 
For Pf = 0.1, every single non self string has a 10% chance of escaping from the detectors. If an intrusion 
consists of only one non changed string, this may be a large error rate and is not acceptable. However, 
intrusion consist of multiple non self strings and it is sufficient to recognize only one of these to activate a 
reaction. If we have to use a much lower failure rate the assumed approximation may no longer hold [6]. 
 
 
 
3.3.1.4  Detector Set Size – A quick summarization 
 
Once again I would like at this point to make a quick summarization of what is happening in the above 
section, for the reader to have a more condensed view and simpler way of understanding the above described 
analysis and concepts. 
 
In these type of systems we will often find the need for tunable parameter as they are dynamic systems. Their 
dynamical nature requires some settings in the form of these parameter for the to achieve the desired effect. 
This is also done so that they do not consume enormous amounts of resources that are needed to perform the 
self tasks. 
 
The analysis presented above is trying to decide an appropriate size for the set of detector agents of the 
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intrusion detection system that will perform to the desired extent. The size should be chosen with two points 
in mind: 
 
1. The size of the repertoire of these strings that are to be used for detection must be as small as 
possible in order to economize the resources and not match self strings. 
 
2. The size should be chosen so that the above condition is satisfied and preferably if not all, a very 
large space of non self strings is covered. 
 
The tunable parameter Pf denotes the acceptable failure rate, or more simply, the amount of non-self strings 
that can be left undetected. Given this acceptable failure rate and the set of self strings S the analysis is trying 
to define a method for the creation of a set of detectors R in such a way to minimize the loss of information 
from S in R.  At the  same time it is trying to keep the repertoire of R as small as possible keeping in mind the 
efficiency requirements. Given that we have an acceptable failure rate, some loss of information is 
acceptable. The amount of the information that can be lost is a main determinant of the size of the detector 
set. 
 
Taking a look at the previous section again, H(S¦R) denotes the entropy that we would have supposing that S 
is given to us and we know R. 
The average information of the self set NS is given by H(S). 
The difference between H(S) and H(S¦R) is the amount of information about S that is being preserved in the 
encoding R. This is denoted by I(S;R). Being able to tune this parameter would make it possible for us to 
define an acceptable set size for the repertoire of detectors given the acceptable failure rate. 
 
However, as stated in the latter part of the previous section many assumption are made here which would not 
be acceptable in real life situation. Therefore the choice of the acceptable failure rate is what determines the 
size of the repertoire of the detectors. A visual example of this is given in the previous section in the table. 
 
 
N.B. The acceptable failure rate is not a performance measure as such. It only states a percentage of 
acceptable failure in the detection of intrusions. So, for Pf = 0.05, we can assume that if 5% of the non-self 
string menage to intrude and are not detected, this is acceptable. However if, even for a 5% acceptability 
level of false negatives, the actual level of them is lower, this does not mean that there is a problem. All it 
means is that it is acceptable to decrease the detector set without breaching the requirements. 
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3.3.1.5  The Existence of Holes 
 
It can be deduced from the previous two sections that in order to achieve the desired failure probability all 
that needs to be done is to choose a large enough detector set. However, there might be a lower bound on the 
level of achievable failure probability as well. This is largely dependent on the specific matching rule used. 
Earlier in this chapter a matching technique is shown, the “r-contiguous bits”. There are a number of detector 
generating algorithms that can be used for the generation of detectors which are to be discussed later in the 
chapter and can be seen in [6][5]. These make it possible to generate a complete repertoire of detectors. This 
means that such algorithms can generate all non-self strings that can be covered. 
 
However, according to [6], there is a set of non-self strings in the case of the r-contiguous bits matching rule, 
called “holes”,  for which it is not possible to generate valid detectors. The explanation of this is as follows 
and it is extracted from [6] 
If S contains two strings s1 and s2 that match each other over at least (r-1) contiguous bits, they may induce 
two other strings h1 and h2 that can not be detected because any candidate detector would also match one of 
s1 or s2. This illustrated below for two 16 - bit strings with r = 7 
 
 s1: 0000010101000000 
 s2 1111 010101 111111 
 
this would lead to: 
 
 h1: 0000010101111111 
 h2:1111 010101000000 
 
The previous example as shown in [6], illustrates the existence of holes in the case of use of the r-contiguous 
bits matching rule which was chosen throughout the analysis. 
 
However other matching rules may be used and, such as the Humming Distance Rule. It is also shown in [6] 
that holes exist in the case of use of this rule too. 
 
For this illustration the reader must be familiar with two concepts as follows: 
 
? Cartesian Plane: A two dimensional plane where all points can be represented as coordinates. [25] 
 
? Euclidean Distance: The straight line distance between two points on a plane. [26] 
 
When using a Hamming distance rule (two strings match if their Hamming distance is less then or equal to a 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
77
fixed radius r), such a situation is also possible. The next figure, extracted from [6], shows this point using a 
diagrammatic approach on a Cartesian plane. A match between a string and a detector is said to occur if the 
Euclidean distance between the corresponding points is less than a predefined radius r. Figure 3.4 illustrates 
holes visually. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. In this figure, if self points are presented as points in a plane and the 
matching rule is Euclidean distance, the three self strings s1, s2 and s3, may include 
a hole h for which no valid detector can be generated.[6] 
 
The analysis tries to show that all practical matching rules with a constant matching probability, meaning that 
each detector matches equally many strings and vice versa, can exhibit holes even with non trivial set of self 
strings. 
Let us have the following example as by [6]: 
 
U = set of all strings 
S = set of strings to be protected 
Matches(d) = the strings matched by detector d 
Matched(s) = the detector string that s is matched by 
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Given string h and a matching rule M with constant matching probability Pm, the existence of a hole can be 
shown by generating a set S such that h is a hole. 
 
Starting with the empty set for each detector d matching h, a string sd is picked so that it is matched by d and 
added to S. Then, by construction, for each possible detector h there is an existent self string matching that 
detector. Set S, constructed in this manner will be non trivial if it does not need to contain a significant 
portion of the total space denominated by U. 
 
The existence of these holes imposes a lower bound for the probability of failure achievable with a given 
detection method. This happens because it will always fail to detect holes. At this point some techniques for 
working around this problem are presented. 
 
If we calculate the required number of detectors to achieve a certain acceptable failure probability, without 
taking holes into account, the achieved probability in real life, would mos likely be higher than the desired 
one. Failure probability associated with holes, also does not improve by distributing the algorithm through 
different sites if the same matching rule is adopted throughout the sites. Even though detector sets,generated 
at different sites, would most likely be very diverse, holes would probably be quite similar. It might be useful 
to spread out the self strings apart as much as possible, thus reducing the holes between them. This is 
achievable through the randomization of each self string with a hash function. It is also possible to use 
detectors with a larger specificity. This would correspond to a smaller radius in the previous graphical 
representation. Of course this would mean a larger detector set. 
 
A further approach for a solution is to try an eliminate holes entirely. This can be achieved locally or in a 
distributed fashion. [6] 
 
Locally it can be achieved through the use of a matching rule that does not show holes. In the case of the 
much mentioned r-contiguous bits rule, we can choose a value for r so that 1(number one) <= r <= l(letter l). 
Where detectors will match anything between the entire string space and a single string, itself, such that 
potential holes can be filled by detectors with very high specificity. The value of r would have to be stored 
with each detector. 
In a distributed fashion, where different machines run their own detector sets, a different matching rule can 
be chosen for each machine. In this case, it is thought that each machine would have a different set of holes 
that would be covered by the detectors form other machines. 
 
The existence of holes is not necessarily something to be viewed negatively. Given that these holes are 
generated by interactions of self strings, they will tend to be very similar to them. Case in which, given a 
level of tolerance, we would not want to be detecting strings that are so similar to self. [5][6] 
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3.3.1.6  The Existence of Holes – A Summary 
 
The previous analysis is trying to illustrate the existence of non-self strings that are not possible to detect. 
This meaning that a detector can not be generated for them as it will be matched by a string in the self set and 
therefore not accepted. 
 
What the analysis is trying to prove also is that the existence of holes is not necessarily a negative thing. The 
reason for this is that we would not like to have detections that are so close to the self set. This could lead to a 
legitimate self string being rejected.  
 
However, I would like the reader to keep the existence of holes in mind as further a method for dealing with 
such issue will be introduced. This is the counting the holes method. 
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3.4  Negative Selection Methods 
 
This section is intended to present the reader with a number of algorithms that are designed for the purpose of 
generating the detector sets. Three different algorithms will be presented. These are extracted from publicly 
available research papers such as [5][6]. These algorithms present methods for the generation of the detectors 
to be used in the process of self/non-self discrimination. A good analogy is made here from the methods of 
work of the human immune system. The particular way that these algorithms work are not of a large 
importance as they are just based around the same principle, therefore it is not necessary to have a detailed 
knowledge of them One of them will be presented in detail. The next three are nothing more then step by step 
improvements of each other, each posing better ways to generate the detectors making improvements on the 
time and space needed for the generation of the detectors and improving the space of non-self strings covered 
by them. This study is dealing with the possibilities of embedding immune system principles into the are of 
intrusion detection. The existence of these algorithms will be a good knowledge in the evaluation to be done 
later. Also a good overview of the advantages of each will be deducted, however the detailed work of each 
and every single one of them is not of high relevance to this study. This will not be included in the report, but 
appropriate reference to the resources will be given. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4.1  The Generate-And-Test Algorithm 
 
Initially presented in [5] and later also in [6], this algorithm analogizes the generation of lymphocytes in the 
immune system. The immunological research on this can be found in the first chapter. 
 
The following is a presentation of the generate-and-test algorithm as shown in [5]. 
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In this algorithm, strings are randomly chosen from the set of all strings Ud and then matched against the set 
of self strings S that are to be protected. If the randomly generated strings do not match any of the self strings 
they are kept as valid detectors. This process of random generation and checking is repeated until the desired 
amount of detector strings is created. 
 
N.B. Recall the previous section on Detector Set Size. 
 
Given a predefined matching probability (which was dealt with previously) the Generate-and-Test algorithm 
requires the generation of a repertoire of random detector strings. This is the initial repertoire of strings 
before the negative selection. It is denoted by Nro. 
 
 
For independent detectors it is feasible to approximate the failure probability Pf achieved by NR detectors as 
follows: 
 
For Pm sufficiently small and NR sufficiently large, this gives the following: 
 
The assumption that detectors are independent is not entirely valid. With the increase of NS or Pm, the 
candidate detector set (this would be C in fig. 2) will reduce in size, so the chosen detectors have a lower 
level of independence. Overlap among the detectors decreases the covered amount of string space. This 
results in a higher value of the probability failure rate than the one indicated previously in the following 
equation:  
The time complexity of this algorithm, as indicated in the different references [5][6], is proportional to NR, 
the number of candidate detectors that need to undergo negative selection, and NS, as each candidate may 
have to be compared to all self strings. The time and space complexity as denoted by NS are as follows: 
 
 Time: 
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   Space: 
 
 
 
3.4.2  The Generate-And-Test Algorithm – A brief summarization 
 
The generate-and-test-algorithm makes use of an exhaustive method for the generation of the non-self set. 
Meaning that all possible detectors are generated randomly and compared to the self string in order to be 
negatively selected. The generation stops when the desired size of the detector set has been reached. 
The steps: 
 
1. A repertoire of detectors is randomly generated. 
2. Detectors are checked against self strings. 
3. Detectors matching self strings are eliminated. 
4. Detectors that do not match self strings are added to the negatively selected repertoire. 
 
This algorithm seems a quite good and efficient one. On the plus side, it is simple. But, the computational 
expense is of exponential time to the self set. That is something that is generally not positive. Exponential 
times are not preferred. If the self set is too high, then the problem of computational time taken, grows by a 
lot more than the size of the self set. 
However an inefficiency has to be noted in this algorithm. Most of the candidate detector strings are rejected, 
therefore an easily noticeable waste of precious resources is to be pointed out here. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4.3  Linear Time Algorithm 
 
In this section, the reader is presented with another type of algorithm. This is called the “Linear Time 
Algorithm”. The name is derived from the time in which it runs with respect to the size of the input. 
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The algorithm is presented in detail in [5][6]. For the purpose of this study, the detailed description for it is 
non needed, however it is important to understand the advantages that it has over the previous, generate-and-
test algorithm. 
 
The generate and-test algorithm does and exhaustive generation for the detector set, therefore a lot of 
computational expense is given to the generation of detectors that are rejected through the negative selection 
method. The linear time algorithm generates the detector set in such a way to tackle the problem of rejected 
detectors. The algorithm consists of two phases: 
 
? Phase 1: The first phase enumerates the way in which, according to the matching rule used, the 
strings S in the self set can be matched by randomly generated detectors. 
 
? Phase 2: The second phase, uses the results from the first phase to generate detectors that are not 
matched by the self strings. 
 
The time used for this way of generation of the detector set is better than the one of the generate-and-test-
algorithm, however there is an increase in the space needed for this algorithm to be used. As stated in [5], the 
time needed fro this algorithm is proportional in linear time to the self set. The space needed however is 
exponential to the setting used for r in the matching rule. 
 
There is however one problem with both of the above algorithms. They do not provide any guarantee as to 
what space of non-self is covered by the detectors generated. The detector set does in fact have a limited size, 
as analyzed preciously by the probabilistic approach. The greedy algorithm, used a generation method that 
spreads out the detectors in such a way to achieve a better coverage of the non-self set. 
 
 
3.4.4  Greedy Algorithm 
 
The previous two algorithms still have one problem. The generation of the detectors is entirely random. Their 
being random, does not guarantee that the space of non-self covered by them is adequate. Meaning that, if 
they are high in some level of similarity, sets of them will share coverage over the same amount of space in 
the non self set. The Greedy algorithm tries to address this issue by not doing a random selection of the 
detector set. Instead , the selection is done is such a way, that the detectors are as far apart as possible from 
each other. Details on this algorithm can be viewed in [5]. 
 
This algorithm is also composed of two phases: 
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? Phase 1: This phase assumes that there is an existing set of detectors. It makes use of the self set and 
the existing state of the detector set to set some parameter upon the set of detectors that is to be 
generated. 
 
? Phase 2:  The results from phase one are used in the second phase to generate the set of detectors in 
such a way that as many as possible non-self strings are covered by the detectors set. 
 
The time complexity of this algorithm is quite a bit higher than the time complexity of the linear time 
algorithm. This is a downside that is to be taken in consideration. Clearly there is a decision to be made here 
upon a trade off between time an desired coverage by the detector set. 
The space complexity of this algorithm is of the same order as the one of the linear time algorithm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4.5  Counting the Holes Method 
 
The previous algorithm is in some way an improvement of the linear time algorithm in the context of the 
space coverage that it provides for the detection of non-self strings. However, as previously discussed, [6] 
even with a set of detectors that would cover the entire non self strings, the existence of holes is not possible 
to avoid. The Counting the Holes method can be seen in detail in [5]. 
 
The paper in question [5] states that, if the greedy algorithm is run in an exhaustive manner, then there would 
be a clear way of establishing the number of holes. The number of non detectable non-self strings. However, 
[27] presents a good method for the counting of holes. It is stated in the paper that the use of this method, 
would help with the decision of choosing an appropriate set of parameters for the string length and the 
matching rule parameter. 
 
It is also stated  in [5] that, given a distributed type of architecture for the use of these methods, choosing 
different parameters for the length of the string and the parameter of the matching rule, would contribute 
towards a smaller number of holes. Preferably different matching rules should be used at different sites. As 
by the paper in question, this would create a situation where the holes in one site would be covered by the 
detectors of other sites and vice versa. This would possible in one of the distributed architectures mentioned 
previously in the chapter. 
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3.5  A General Summary 
 
At this point I would once again like to make a summary of what has been dealt with. This chapter has 
introduced the reader to a large amount of information, however only some main points are to be kept in 
ming for the analysis in the next chapter. 
Initially we dealt with investigating into the method for  gaining a sense of self through the monitoring of 
system calls using a windowing method and creating a database that is to be used as a definition of normal 
behavior. 
 
The next analysis looked into some detail about the setting of the parameters such as the ones used for the 
matching rule and the size of the detector set. The existence of holes was also shown and it was made clear 
that they are not possible to avoid. 
 
The next section dealt with the investigation into the different negative selection algorithms created by 
current research that can be used for the generation of the detectors. 
 
Also a method for counting the holes and dealing with them over multiple linked sites was introduced. 
However I would like to make a point here. The research extracted form [6] stated that the existence of holes 
is not necessarily a bad thing as we would not want to be detecting possible non-self strings that are so 
similar to the self strings. Then, the research extracted from [5] showed that these holes can be covered. I 
think that these two principles are contradictory to each other. 
 
In the next chapter, I will deal with some personal analysis and present some personal thoughts on all these 
matters. 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
86
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Evaluation, Analysis & Ideas 
 
The previous chapters introduced the reader to a wide selection of methods, ideas, algorithms etc extracted 
from existing research papers and books. Initially the study dealt with an investigation into the methods and 
techniques of work of the human immune system. Further into the study, the reader, was introduced to a 
number of principles, issues, architectures and algorithms that analogize the workings of the human immune 
system. 
 
The purpose of this chapter will be to evaluate these methods and see to what extent they analogize the 
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methods of work of the human immune system. This evaluation will present the principles that have been 
implemented and the principles that have been left out in this analogy. I would like to present such an 
evaluation in the hope to extract some conclusions concerning the methods that not have been implemented 
by the previously presented algorithms and methods. The conclusions should deduce as to weather the non 
implemented methods are possible to analogize and would they even be beneficial at all. 
 
The reader will also be presented to a number of attack examples that should clarify the weakness of these 
systems if applied in practice. 
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4.1  System Calls for a Sense of Self 
 
In the previous chapter the reader was introduced to a method for deriving a definition of self through the use 
of sequences of system calls for each running process. In this method, we are only considering the system 
call itself. A number of downsides of this method are presented in [7], as follows: 
 
This method for the definition of normal behavior, does not take into account a set of aspects that could be 
vital in the detection of an attack. Parameter values passed between system calls are totally ignored. Also the 
timing information for these calls is not taken into account. Timing here meaning the actual time that the call 
happens during process runtime. Also, this method totally ignores other instructions between these system 
calls, which are in fact quite numerous and could provide a large amount of information about the running of 
the process. [7] 
 
To illustrate some of the above points through an example I would like to consider the following piece of 
code: 
 
int main{ 
 char p[4]; 
 char user_p[4]; 
 p = “abcd”; 
 
 get (user_p); 
 if (!strcmp (p, user_p){ 
  allow ( ); } 
 else{ 
  deny ( ); } 
} 
 
So, the program is creating a buffer of size four for the stored password p, and a buffer of size four for the 
user input user_p. If the two strings match, access is allowed and if they do not access id denied. So, if the 
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user enters the password as abcd, access is allowed. 
 
However consider the following possible input by the user: 
 
>>aaaaaaaa. 
 
User inputs a string of eight a-s. Knowing the structure of this buffer, which is a stack. Meaning that is a last 
in first out type of structure, the first four a-s will get stored in the user_p buffer and the second four a-s will 
create a buffer overflow and overwrite the stored password p. This is supposing that there are no mechanisms 
for the protection of buffer overflows. When the comparison happens, the access will be granted. This attack 
would go totally undetected, as there are no system calls happening that could help it's detection. 
 
This was purely an illustration to show that using system calls would in fact make us miss out on a lot of 
information that would otherwise be indispensable in the detection of an attack. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2  The Architectures 
 
The third chapter introduced the reader to a set of possible architectures for the implementation of such a 
system. I would like to make a quick evaluation of them and try to detect some downsides for each in order to 
see which could possibly be the most optimal one. 
 
? Protecting static data – This approach is one that is similar to the one currently used by traditional 
virus scanners when they do a check of the entire hard drive. Now, of course, with the 
implementation of immunologically inspired methods, the system would have some level of 
adaptability and not rely solely on known signature, however as stated by [7] this approach could 
turn out to be not very practical. First of all, it is slow as it is limited by the speed of the hard drive, 
and secondly there is not much point to it as the data is not going to change and the injected 
malicious instructions would not have any effect on anything until the infected program is loaded 
onto memory and run. I personally do not like this architecture either, simply because it would just 
take a lot of time to run due to the hard drive speed. 
 
? Protecting processes on a single host – As clearly stated, in this approach we are monitoring the 
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active processes. This would create a great advantage in the sense of speed. Active processes would 
be monitored while in runtime and there would not be hard drive speed restrictions during the 
monitoring process. I personally prefer this approach quite more than the previous one. However, 
there are some downsides to this. As the reader will know by now, a training period will be initially 
needed for the establishment of the self database. Given that this is being done on a single host, and 
if there is only one single user, the database will be limited to the behavior of that particular user. 
Therefore the detectors will be created in such a way to be complementary to any other type of 
behavior. Should a different user need to get access to the machine, in order for his actions to be 
allowed he must have a very similar behavior to the one of the user that did the training process. 
 
? Protecting a network of mutually trusting computers – As mentioned previously, this proposal 
for an architecture is a very interesting one. A set of computers, belonging to a network are mutually 
trusted. The processes acting as lymphocytes roam around the network and look for anomalous 
behavior. As stated in [17], there is one major problem with this system. A solid framework is 
needed for these processes to be allowed to share core information between all machines. Now, I 
would like to propose the following scenario. Let us suppose that one machine is compromised. 
Given that any lymphocyte process is able to obtain all information about any machine on the 
network, the user on the compromised machine would be able to get this information. This would 
lead to the entire network being compromised. 
 
? Protecting a network of mutually trusting disposable computers – This architecture assumes that 
a set of machines will act as lymphocytes only. If needed one of the lymphocyte machines would 
even sacrifice itself in order to protect a machine that is being threatened. The same problem as with 
the previous scenario arises. What if one of the lymphocyte machines is broken. The reader has been 
introduced to the concept of holes (non detectable non-self strings). If the attacker is able to find one 
of these, compromising one of the lymphocytes would mean compromising all the lymphocytes, 
therefore the entire network. However, as stated by the counting the holes method, different 
matching techniques can be used on different lymphocytes to cover the possible holes of each other. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.1 The Architectures – Some conclusions 
 
There is one particular point which I would like to put some attention on. There will always be ways to break 
any type of security system, however, these architectures only pose a framework for an additional level of 
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security. If the existing methods have some holes, then this extra layer would probably cover some of them. 
By no means would it make the system perfects, however it would make it better. 
 
The choice of architecture is not one that is to be decided upon which one is the best. I can say that the best 
would be the one that is possible to implement according to the needs of the user and the implementation 
specifications and requirements.  
4.3  Data Splitting & Detector Set Size 
 
I would like to pay some attention to the process of splitting the data stream into, what then are assumed to 
be, independent strings, the decision for the size of the detector set and the negative selection methods to see 
to what extent these methods, as created by research, have imitated the adaptive immune system of our 
bodies. In particular I would like to take a look at the concept of hypermutation. The reader will be able to 
recall these concepts from chapter one and the role they play in the adaptive immune system. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.1 Splitting the Data 
 
As shown in the analysis portrayed in chapter three, the splitting of the data stream into independent strings 
creates a loss of information. I think there is a major issue here for which I have not been able to find any 
articles in any research papers, however I will try and bring forward some thought of my own. 
 
Given a data stream that we have decided to use for the definition of the self set, whatever this may be, ( we 
have used system calls, however other possibilities are present, e.g. Key typing behavior) we split that data 
stream into strings and assume that there is no dependence between these strings. The reason for this is that 
we need to create structures that we can use for the monitoring process. This analogizes the protein structures 
used for the monitoring process in the human immune system. However, as described in the previous chapter, 
this data stream splitting creates a loss of information. 
 
The immune system bases this recognition process around the recognition of some structures, however even 
though these protein structures do not contain all possible information needed, and neither do the detectors on 
each lymphocyte, the DNA inside each lymphocyte cell does. So, analogizing with our example, the DNA 
contains all possible, acceptable full streams of system call sequences. These, are then split into subsequences 
portrayed in the detectors.  
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Our system does not, in any way, hold the entire set of all acceptable self, full sequences. Given this gap 
between the two I think some analysis should go into this in the future work of this research field. 
 
 
4.3.2 Detector Set Size & Holes 
 
As in the human immune system, the methods described in the previous chapter, do not maintain a full 
detector set that is capable of detecting all possible non-self strings. Even if a full set was maintained, the 
existence of holes, as previously shown, would still make the coverage of all non-self strings impossible. 
However, when accepting a failure probability, and given that we decide upon the size of the detector set, do 
we then maintain this set constant, or is this set renewed from time to time. The current research papers do 
not state anything about this fact, so I would like to make some points from my own thought. 
 
If a set of detectors is constant, then it is more vulnerable. An attacker, assuming he has the time and 
possibility to carry out numerous attacks, would be able to gain an idea upon the detector set after a while if 
this set stays constant. Also it has to be remembered that if the attacker is able to execute the protection 
process, he will be able to read the binary. Therefore he will be able to eventually create the detector set and 
get a clear idea of what is detectable or not. Therefore, it would be a wise decision to make the detector set 
dynamically change through time. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.3 Hypermutation 
 
The concepts of hyper mutation and immunological memory are two concepts that I have not been able to 
find implemented in the current methods researched in the previous chapter. To remind the reader, the process 
of hyper mutation is the process that the detectors of cloned lymphocytes undergo when a bind has been 
established with an antigenic structure. This increases their specificity to that pathogenic structure to make it 
easier for them to recognize future occurrences of that or a similar kind of antigen. 
 
The reader should at this point recall the linear time algorithm and the way that it enumerates the all possible 
matches in the self set in order to create detectors that will not bind to the self strings.  
A similar method can be created for the purpose of hypermutation. When a detector is activated and binds to 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
93
a non-self strings, that detector should undergo a hypermutation process to generate clones that will bind to 
non-self strings that could be similar to the one detected. 
 
 
So, suppose the detected non self strings is: 
 
11101010100 
 
where the underlined bits are the bits that caused the detection through the matching rule (in this case r-
contiguous bits), a windowing process can be used to enumerate all the possible ways in which this string can 
be matched. This is by sliding a window of size r (where r is the parameter of the matching rule) over it and 
moving it one position at a time. This would create the following (in our case r = 5): 
 
11101****** 
*11010***** 
**10101**** ...... and so on 
 
Detectors could be created that contain these substrings. Of course, the cloned detectors that have been 
created through this hypermutation must undergo the negative selection process too in order to make sure 
they are tolerant to the self strings and will not detect any of them. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4  Dual Authentication 
 
I would ask the reader at this point to recall the dual authentication method of the immune system when a 
possible antigenic structure is found. The B-cells recognize the non-self structure, however, they still need the 
authorization of TH-cells. These latter ones make sure that the bind is legitimate and this prevents 
autoimmune responses. 
 
This is a concept that has been entirely over looked in the methods presented in the previous chapter. Yes, of 
course the detectors are made tolerant to the self strings through negative selection, however the actual dual 
authentication does not happen anywhere. 
 
Let us consider the following scenario. A machine has undergone the training process through use by one 
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person only. This has made it possible to create a self set and the adequate detectors through any chosen 
negative selection algorithm. A second person sits in front of the machine and starts using it with totally 
different behavioral patterns. The actions of this person will be legitimate, however there is a good chance 
that some of them may be detected as non-self. Having a dual authentication in this case, by making use of 
the detector set for detecting possible intrusions and also by using the self set with an appropriate matching 
rule for authorization might solve the problem to some extent. 
 
So, when a detector is activated, instead of immediately rejecting the string, a secondary comparison with the 
chosen matching rule is made against the self set. If the string does not appear in the self set either it is 
rejected. This process however will increase the time and space complexity for the detection process as now 
two databases have to be consulted instead of just one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.5  General Conclusions and Opinions 
 
I would like to present the reader at this point with a set of conclusions and some personal opinions that I 
have gained during the course of this study. 
 
I have to agree that the study of the human immune system and the analogies made from it into methods for 
the defense of computer systems from malicious attacks can be a largely beneficial discipline. A set of good 
knowledge has been gained by myself through conducting this study and the research needed for it. I would 
like however, to express my own opinion concerning the possibilities of applying such concepts in real life 
situation. 
 
The inspiration of all these methods comes from the human immune system and its cellular based defense 
mechanisms. There is one major point to be made here. The immune system is based around the principle that 
all cell are redundant. If one or a few get destroyed it is not a problem. They can be regenerated. This is not 
the case with most computer systems. Our computer systems are not redundant. If a computer in a network 
gets compromised, the user will not be able to just relocate to a different one immediately, as precious data is 
lost. Because of the above, I do not think that there is a real life future for the methods covered in this study. 
 
However, there is in fact one real life example where such a system would have a possibility of success I 
think. We are all familiar with computer farms. A large set of computers linked together for the purpose of 
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sharing the computational expense of one or more processes. In this case it can be considered that they are 
redundant. In fact, if one of them is compromised, then the only damage is that the same amount of 
computation must be shared between a smaller number of machines. Given this case, such a system could be 
applied in this case.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
96
 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
[1] –  “Immunology Basics” Prof Genc Sylcebe and Ass. Prof. Arben Hoxha – Base text for the faculty 
of   medicine Tirana. - 2001. 
 
[2] –  “The Immune System” - www.library.thinkquest.com. 
 
[3] –  “ Immunology Overview” - Armand S. Goldman and Bellur S Prabhakar. 
 
[4] –  “MHC Complex” - www.keratin.com/am/am022.html. 
 
[5] –  “An Immunological Approach to Change Detection: Algorithms, Analysis and Implications” Patrik 
 D'haeseleer, Stephanie Forrest, Paul Helman. 
 
[6] –  “A Distributes Approach to Anomaly Detecton” Patrik D'haeseleer, Stephanie Forrest, Paul 
Helman. 
 
[7] –  “A Sense of Self for UNIX Processes” Stephanie Forrest , Steven A. Hoffmeyr and Anil Somayaji 
–  In proceeding of the 1996 IEEE symposium on security and privacy. 
 
[8] –  “Classification and Detection of Computer Intrusions” S.Kumar – PhD Thesis – Department of 
 Computer Science, Purdue University – August 1995. 
 
[9] –  “Automated Detection of Vulnerabilities in Privileged Programs by Execution Monitoring” C. Ko,  
 G. Fink and K. Levitt – In proceedings of the 10-th annual Computer Security Applications 
 Conference – December 1994. 
 
[10] –  “An Immunological Model of Distributed Detection and its Application to Computer Security” 
 Steven Andrew Hofmeyr – May 1999. 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
97
[11] –  “Implementation of a Computer Immune System for Intrusion and Virus Detection” Markus 
 Christoph Unterleitner – February 2006. 
 
[12] –  “Cellular and Molecular Immunology” Abul K. Abbas, Andrew H. Lichtman and Jordan S. Pober. 
 
[13] –  “Self/NonSelf Discrimination in a Computer” Stephanie Forrest, Alan S. Perelson, Lawrence 
Allen.  and Rajesh Cherkuri – In Proceedings of 1994 IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and 
 Privacy. 
 
[14] –  “Computer Immunology” Steven A. Hofmeyr, Stephanie Forrest and Anil Somayaji. 
 
[15] – “Biologically Inspired Immune System for Computers” Jeffrey O. Kephart – Fourth International 
 Workshop on the Sysnthesis and Simulation of Living Systems. 
 
[16] –  “Comparing Immunological and Rule Based Intrusion Detection Methods” John Hall. 
 
[17] –  “Principles of a Computer Immune System” Anil Somayaji, Steven Hofmeyr and Stephanie 
Forrest  – 1997 New Security Paradigms Workshop, Langdale, Cumbria. 
 
[18] –  “Computer Security” a.k.a. “The Yellow Book” Jason Crampton – 2006. 
 
[19] –  “The Protection of Information in Computer Systems” J. Saltzer and M. Shroeder – In Proceedings 
 of the IEEE – 1975.  
 
[20] –  “A Principle of Kernel Design” G. J. Popek – In Proceedings of the 1974 NCC AFIPS Conference, 
 Volume 43 – 1974. 
 
[21] –  “Intrusion Detection Using Sequences of System Calls” Steven A. Hofmeyr, Stephanie Forrest, 
Anil  Somayaji – December 1997. 
 
[22] –  “Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary of Current English” - AS Hornby – New Edition – 1974. 
 
[23] –  “Kerberos: An Authentication Service for Computer Networks” B. C. Newman and T. Ts'o – IEEE 
 Communications Magazine – 1994. 
 
[24] –  “Comparing Immunological and Rule Based Intrusion Detection Methods” John Hall. 
 
[25] –  “The Free On-Line Dictionary” - www.thefreedictionary.com. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
98
 
[26] –  “NIST Official Website” - www.nist.org. 
 
[27] –  “Further Efficient Algorithms for Generating Antibody Strings” P. D'haeseleer – Technical Report 
 CS95-3 – 1995. 
